The Iranians are at the borders - By Avi Issacharoff -
With its ascendancy in Syria, the Islamic Republic is seeking to consolidate its position against Israel and the US
Eleven years have gone by since the outbreak of the Second Lebanon War, which began with the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers, Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev. It ended 34 days later with a trumpet blast from Hezbollah, which had lost approximately 700 of its troops.
But those losses were a small thing in light of the deaths of 164 Israelis, which constituted part of "the God-given victory" - at least according to the enormous billboards that were placed throughout Lebanon to establish the narrative that many people there, and throughout the Middle East, believed.
Those were the glory days of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, who portrayed himself as having faced down the strongest army in the region, striking the State of Israel. Nasrallah was the most admired Arab leader at the time, both within Lebanon and outside, and among Sunnis and Shi'ites alike.
He remains one of the most prominent leaders in the Middle East, but his status among the various Arab countries has declined drastically. Many people, including in Lebanon (except for his Shi'ite supporters), see Nasrallah as a puppet of Iran, rushing to obey the orders of his masters in Tehran. The Arab television networks that were so quick to embrace him following his "victory" over the Israelis, now excoriate him and accuse him and his associates of nothing less than crimes against humanity.
Nasrallah is the main reason for Hezbollah's participation in the Syrian civil war. While there are quite a few benefits to this, there are disadvantages as well.
After the Islamic State terror group's defeat in Iraq and the American military's admission that it is operating in Raqqa, IS's capital in Syria, Nasrallah has become a critically important part of the victors' camp, and as such, he gets a share of the spoils.
Although Hezbollah and Syrian President Bashar Assad's army have retaken large parts of Syria (with help from the Russians), the former is in no hurry to bring its troops back to Lebanon. This has broad significance. Hezbollah's transitory military positions throughout Syria have become temporary, and the temporary outposts are in the process of becoming permanent, with soldiers' barracks, prefabricated structures, and everything that indicates an established position or a transition to a permanent presence on the ground.
Nasrallah and his organization are turning Syria into Hezbollah's backyard as part of Iran's campaign to create a Shi'ite crescent between Tehran and the Mediterranean Sea. For Israel, this means that Hezbollah, together with Iran, will be able to set up a local Shi'ite army in Syria or on the Syrian Golan Heights - an army that will operate against Israeli targets without making Lebanon pay the price.
Even as decision-makers in Israel proclaim a policy that "Lebanon will pay" for any escalation by Hezbollah, the organization itself could try to draw the fire away from Lebanon and use Syria as the preparation ground for its terror attacks, allowing Hezbollah to have it both ways. The advantages do not end there, though: Hezbollah will have access to, and acquire ownership of, advanced weapons and intelligence formerly in the possession of the Syrian army. It will gain technological equipment, weapons that "violate the balance of power," and pretty much everything else.
Still, belonging to the winning camp carries with it a heavy, and even a very heavy, price. This has to do not only with the loss of public popularity, but also with the fact that its public, the Shi'ites, must pay so dearly in blood for the saving of Assad. The number of fallen Hezbollah troops is estimated at 1,800 to 2,000. A Syrian journalist published photographs this week of two Lebanese teenagers, about 15 years old, who were killed in battle in Syria as they fought in Hezbollah's ranks. Approximately 6,000 Hezbollah troops have been wounded.
In other words, Hezbollah's fighting force has been severely compromised. An army that has lost approximately one-third of its combat troops and must provide financial assistance to its wounded and the families of its fallen naturally loses enormous sums of money in addition to support. It will take Hezbollah years to recover from the injuries it suffered in the battles in Syria, and at the moment it is likely not all that eager for an escalation with Israel.
The battle for regional hegemony
An escalation with Israel is not a matter of the highest priority for Hezbollah. For now, its leaders view the struggle of the Shi'ite-Russian axis against the Sunnis in the Middle East and mainly against the United States and its allies as the critical fight.
Hezbollah realizes that it is just one more militia working in the Iranians' service in the real war over the division of areas of influence belonging to what is left of Syria. The battle, or race, is against the Americans, not against Israel; this may be the reason why Hezbollah has established itself in Syria.
Two completely separate fronts have been operating in the Syrian sector for approximately two years now. One belongs to the Syrian army in the western part of the country, together with its allies from Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah. The focus there was on the "ordinary" Syrian opposition - in other words, from the al-Qaeda linked Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly known as al-Nusra Front) to more moderate groups.
The second front is in the eastern part of the country under the leadership of the US and its allies against IS. The Assad regime's deployment in the western part of Syria and along the route connecting Damascus and Homs with the coastline freed up resources and energy to deal with the takeover by the US' allies of territories in the eastern portion. The Americans, for their part, are helping various Arab tribes in the southeast who are organized in the Free Syrian Army near the Deir ez-Zor region, and the Kurds and other Arab troops organized under the umbrella of the Syrian Democratic Forces.
The latter groups, who are the ones leading the battle in Raqqa together with the US special forces there, have succeeded in encircling IS's capital. But the Americans already know what the catch is: By fighting against Islamic State, they are enabling the axis of Russia, Assad, Iran, and Hezbollah to gain strength, establish their control, and even have the leisure to fight the US and the moderate Syrian opposition for territory that IS will be giving up in the future.
The American military effort, for all practical purposes, is paving the way for the Iranians to take control over the area with close Russian assistance. This is why the Iranians are trying to move Shi'ite militias into this area of Syria - the southeastern portion - to prepare for a possible confrontation with the Free Syrian Army.
Iran is already treating Syria like its 15th province (the 14th being Bahrain). It keeps about 15,000 Shi'ite troops from Afghanistan and Pakistan there. Approximately 8,000 combat soldiers of Hezbollah and several hundred military advisors from the Revolutionary Guards are also deployed in Syria.
Iran recently received Assad's consent, in principle, to its request to build a seaport of its own on the coast, like the seaport that the Russians maintain there. The port is to be Iranian in every way, with no possibility for the Syrians to operate.
The Iranians are currently invested in real-estate projects in Syria as well as in the phosphates industry and communications networks, and are expected to make a great deal of money from Syria's reconstruction.
They have also been running Shi'ite militias close to the border with Jordan and Israel, on the Syrian Golan Heights, and in the Daraa district, though not on a massive scale. This is not because they wanted it this way, but mainly because the current focus, as stated, is on competing with the Americans rather than with Israel. Paradoxically, the cease-fire that went into effect last week on the Syrian Golan Heights and in Daraa and As-Suwayda will help the Shi'ite axis far more than its opponents.
A New "Arab Spring" in the Persian Gulf? - By Dr. Edy Cohen - https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/arab-spring-persian-gulf/
The winds of war blowing between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, as well as Iranian subversion, are destabilizing the Persian Gulf principalities. To make matters worse, the economic situation, which has worsened in recent years because of ill-advised decisions, is stoking fears of popular uprisings and widespread disturbances. These internal crises could lead to a new "Arab Spring" in which some of the Gulf monarchies might fall. The main winner would be Tehran, for which the current crisis, along with the boycott imposed on Qatar, has opened a path to a takeover of Bahrain - and Iran has already, in effect, taken over Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, and Sana'a.
The Saudi economy has seen an unprecedented deterioration in recent years. The continued decline of oil prices in world markets, the massive assistance to Egypt since the July 2013 takeover by Abdel Fattah Sisi, the cost of funding the coalition fighting the Houthis and their Iranian patrons in Yemen, and of course the considerable aid extended to the Syrian rebels have wreaked havoc on Riyadh's public treasury and the ruling monarchy's personal wealth.
As a result, Riyadh has had to slash 900 riyals (about $300) from military and civil servant salaries as part of a major cutback in the public sector, including the abolition of salary increments and bonuses. Recently, the authorities have also had to hike taxes on cigarettes and energy drinks to the tune of 100% of the cost of the product, after having imposed new taxes in June. One sign of the crisis reflecting its severity is a new toll that will go into effect in April 2018 on roads in the Riyadh area and on crossings into neighboring Arab states.
Aside from affecting its own residents, Saudi Arabia's economic situation also stands to affect other Gulf countries and particularly Bahrain, which is suffering its own deep crisis as Tehran arms and funds Shiite organizations aimed at destabilizing it.
The Iranians have been exploiting Riyadh's and Bahrain's difficulties to the hilt. Not long ago, the Saudis thwarted an attack near the holy sites of Mecca. The Iranian subversion could escalate to the point of seeking to destabilize the kingdom (as it is doing in Bahrain) by activating armed militias within its territory.
Shiite Iran is also helping Qatar, which, according to the (Saudi) plan, should by now have been begging for the lifting of the boycott. Tehran is thereby driving a wedge between the Arab Gulf principalities and bolstering its own status as the region's hegemonic power. It has been sending Qatar tons of food and raw materials daily by sea, and these goods have flooded the emirate's markets and shopping centers.
There is, however, no free lunch. Tehran is now regarded as having rescued Qatar, and the principality will have to reward it for this. Iranian aid has already weakened the Sunni political-military coalition that was supposed to contend with Tehran's expansionary ambitions. For example, Qatar has pulled out of the anti-Houthi coalition in Yemen.
The state of affairs in the Persian Gulf is extremely delicate. The fall of one principality would probably lead to the fall of others. The Gulf is undergoing one of the most difficult economic crises in its history, one that could destabilize some of the monarchies. Angry demonstrations and riots against rising prices, new taxes, and mounting unemployment, similar to those that occurred in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria in 2010 and 2011 - the ultimate nightmare of any Arab leader - are entirely plausible.
Moreover, the Qatar crisis is not over. The principality has strongly rebuffed the twelve Saudi conditions for lifting the blockade and normalizing relations with the foursome (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain). Those conditions include downgrading Qatar's diplomatic ties with Tehran; ensuring that forces of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps leave the emirate; shutting Turkish military bases in Qatar; severing Doha's ties with the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, and ISIS while ceasing to fund them; handing over terrorists residing in Qatar to the foursome; closing the Al Jazeera network; and paying compensation.
The failure of the attempt to isolate Qatar and subjugate it to the foursome's demands has stirred fears of a Saudi military intervention there. Iran, however, has scored many points with the Arabs thanks to its support for the emirate. This is part of a long-term strategic game in which Iran first seeks to win Arab states' sympathy and then arms and activates subversive groups in the Gulf.
Tehran is striving to curtail American and Saudi influence in the Gulf, take over the Islamic world in general, and seize the Gulf's natural resources and holy places via its erstwhile proxies, the Yemeni Houthis positioned along the Saudi border.
If Tehran's plan succeeds, the Persian Gulf will be effectively divided between it and Russia, a highly undesirable development for Israel. The Gulf crisis is wholly unrelated to Israel, but Jerusalem must closely monitor what is happening there.
The current situation is ostensibly good for the US. Tensions create the perfect setting for exporting weapons and military equipment, as President Trump promised he would do during his Riyadh visit. Yet instead of seeking profits, however substantial, Washington would be better off working to enhance stability in the region, lest it plunge into a new "Arab Spring."
Israel and Hezbollah: The Battle Before the Battle - By Jonathan Spyer -
During the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, Israeli military actions were limited by the broader diplomatic situation. The expulsion of Syria from Lebanon had taken place a year earlier. The government of then prime minister Fuad Siniora in Beirut was considered one of the few successes of the US democracy promotion project in the region. As a result, pressure was placed on Israel to restrict its operations to targets directly related to Hezbollah activity alone.
Ten years is a long time. Today, the view in Israel is that the distinction between Hezbollah and the institutions and authorities of the Lebanese state has disappeared.
But while the government of Lebanon is no longer a particular prot�g� of the US and the west, the position taken in western capitals regarding the Lebanese state and, notably, its armed forces remains markedly different to that taken in Jerusalem. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) continues to be a major beneficiary of US aid. This gap in perceptions reflects different primary security concerns. For Israel, altering this perception in the west before the next conflict with Hezbollah is a primary strategic task.
So, what are the facts of the case?
One of the basic expectations of a functioning state is that it exercises a monopoly of the use of violence within its borders. From this point of view, the Lebanese state ceased to function some time ago. As the 2006 war and subsequent events graphically demonstrated, Hezbollah and its patrons could operate an independent foreign and military policy without seeking the permission of the official authorities in Beirut.
What has happened in the intervening decade, however, is that Hezbollah and its allies, rather than simply ignoring the wishes of the state, have progressively absorbed its institutions.
The events of May/June 2008 in Beirut finally demonstrated the impotence of 'official' Lebanon in opposing the will of Hezbollah and its allies.
Then, on the official political level, Hezbollah and its allies prevented the appointment of a Lebanese president for two years, before ensuring the ascendance of their own allied candidate, General Michel Aoun in October 2016. For good measure, the March 8 bloc of which Hezbollah is a part ensured for itself 8 portfolios in the 17 persons Lebanese Cabinet. Of these, two are directly in the hands of Hezbollah.
So at the level of political leadership, it is no longer possible to identify where the Lebanese state begins and Hezbollah ends. And the organization has long enjoyed a de facto, physical dominance, both within Lebanon and in terms of its actions across and beyond its borders (against Israel, in its intervention in the Syrian civil war, and in its involvement with other pro-Iranian militia groups in Iraq and Yemen).
What if the issue of security cooperation between Hezbollah and the Lebanese Armed Forces?
No serious observer of Lebanon disputes that open cooperation between the two forces has increased over the last half decade. The background to this is the threat of Salafi jihadi terrorism from Syrian Salafi groups engaged in the Syrian civil war. A series of bombings in Shia south Beirut and in border communities triggered the joint effort by Hezbollah and the LAF.
Of course, the bombings were taking place as retaliation by Syrian Salafis for Hezbollah's own involvement in the war in Syria on the regime side. The LAF and Hezbollah cooperated on the level of intelligence cooperation, and scored a number of successes in locating and apprehending Salafi cells on Lebanese soil.
As a result of the increasingly overt cooperation between the LAF and Hezbollah, Saudi Arabia ended its military assistance to the LAF, canceling a $3 billion pledge in February 2016. The cancellation was a tacit admission of defeat by the Saudis, an acknowledgment that their project of exerting influence and power in Lebanon through their clients had failed.
The US, however, has continued its relationship with the LAF, which was the recipient of $200 million in assistance from Washington last year. Last December, the US dismissed Israeli assertions that M113 armored vehicles displayed by Hezbollah in a triumphant parade in the town of Qasayr in Syria came from LAF stocks. The LAF, according to a statement by John Kirby, the State Department Spokesman, has an 'exemplary record' in complying with US end-use guidelines and restrictions.
A statement by Lebanese President Michel Aoun in February appeared to confirm the situation of cooperation between the forces. Aoun told the Egyptian CBC channel that Hezbollah's arms 'do not contradict the state...and are an essential part of defending Lebanon. As long as the Lebanese army lacks sufficient power to face Israel, we feel the need for 'Hezbollah's arsenal, because it complements the army's role.'
The difference of opinion between the US and Israel in this regard is of growing importance because of the emergent evidence of hitherto unreported Hezbollah activities. In particular, there is deep disquiet in Israel regarding revelations of an Iranian-supported, homegrown Hezbollah arms industry. This, combined with what may be the beginnings of a slow winding down of the Syrian war raises the possibility of renewed tensions with Hezbollah.
This does not mean that war is imminent. But from an Israeli point of view, the gap in understanding and perception between Washington and Jerusalem on the LAF, and by definition on the current nature of the Lebanese state, is a matter requiring urgent attention. It is currently one of the missing pieces in the diplomatic structure which alone can make possible the kind of war that Israel will be wanting to fight next time round, should Hezbollah attack or provocation come.
This is intended to be a war on a quite different scale and dimension to 2006.
The intention will be to dismiss any distinction between Hezbollah and the Lebanese state, and to wage a state to state war against Lebanon, on the basis that the distinction has become a fiction. This will involve an all-out use of military force that will be intended to force a relatively quick decision.
For this to be conceivable, a diplomatic battle has to first be won. This is the battle to convince the west, or at least the US, that an Iranian proxy militia has today effectively swallowed the Lebanese state, making war against the former by its very nature involve war against the latter. This battle before the battle has not yet been won. It is part of a larger Israeli hope to focus the US and the west on Iran and Shia political Islam, in place of the current western focus on the Sunni variety. Only thus will Israel be able to establish the strategic depth in the diplomatic arena that will enable, if necessary, its plans in the event of war with Hizballah to be carried out.
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