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Friday, August 25, 2017

IRAN UPDATE: 8.26.17 - How serious are Iranian nuclear threats?

 
How serious are Iranian nuclear threats? - Yonah Jeremy Bob -  http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Iran-News/How-serious-are-Iranian-nuclear-threats-503276
 
There are at least two key points to make about Iran's threat on Tuesday that it could highly enrich uranium within five days if it chooses to pull out of the nuclear deal with the West.
 
The first is that this has nothing to do with Iran developing a nuclear bomb in a matter of days. Estimates of its ability to breakout to develop a nuclear weapon if it walked away from the deal range from between six and 12 months.
 
The second, as put forth by INSS Iran expert Emily Landau and others, is that Iran's threat is a sign of continued noncooperation as the debate about how the US and Israel should view the deal continues.
 
First, debunking Iran's threat.
 
Read carefully:  Iran was not threatening to enrich uranium to the 90% range, which is needed to achieve weaponization.
 
Rather, it was threatening to enrich uranium from the 3-5% range to the 20% range that it had before the deal.
 
Twenty percent means that Iran has less to do to get the uranium to 90%, but it is still far from being weaponized.
 
Also, Iran has depleted its once large stock of already enriched uranium.
 
While Obama administration figures said the deal would hold off Iran from breaking out for at least 12 months, the Institute for Science and International Security and others have said Iran could breakout in as few as six months. Six months is still not five days.
 
Why is Iran trying to sound like it can get to a nuclear weapon faster than it can? Landau notes that Iran wants the deal to continue, "because otherwise it would lose economic benefits so it is in their short and medium term interest to keep it..., and it is not a bad deal for them as they can move to get nuclear weapons" when its terms expire "while getting stronger regionally."
 
In other words, Iran does not want to lose the deal's pluses and wants to pressure the West to stick to the deal as is, without tougher enforcement that it is worried about from the Trump administration.
 
Why are Iran's threats significant? Landau explains that many of those who are afraid of pressing Iran to change its disruptive regional behavior lest it walk away from the deal, continue to focus on Iran as being technically mostly compliant with the agreement.
 
In contrast, she said Iran's threats show that it is not cooperative and gives support to those who say Iran may have secret breakout plans lined up and concealed nuclear activities.
 
The international community might need to ask Iran how it would enrich uranium to 20% in only five days, which might suggest that Iran could break out faster than the "fast" six-month estimate.
 
"How does the threat square with Iran's commitments under the nuclear deal?" asked Landau, contending that more violations might be discovered if inspectors look into Iran's threat.
 
Further, it signals that Iran's mentality is not that of a state which has moved on from seeking nuclear weapons.
 
Obviously, much of Iran's latest threat is also part of its back and forth with the Trump administration, which is making plenty of its own threats. But Landau points out that Iran made plenty of threats against the more friendly Obama administration as well.
 
Ironically then, Iran's threat to leave the deal both exposes its true desire to milk the deal for the benefits it offers economically without permanent limits on its nuclear abilities, and signals that Iran has not given up on its nuclear ambitions long-term.
 
 
The Middle East's great rivalry isn't likely to end
 
News that Iran's and Turkey's governments reached an accord on Idlib, a Syrian town now the focus of American interests, brings relations between the two of the largest and most influential states in the Middle East momentarily out of the shadows.
 
Their rivalry goes back a half-millennium, included 11 wars and now remains, in the words of the Washington Institute's Soner Cagaptay, the region's "oldest power game." What does the recent accord signify, and how will their competition influence the region's future?
 
Iranian and Turkish parallels are noteworthy. Both countries have populations of 80 million. (Egypt, the region's third large country, has 96 million.) Both boast ancient civilizations, long imperial histories, tensions with Russia, and a successful avoidance of European colonialism. In modern times, each came under the rule of a ruthless modernizer after World War I, followed more recently by an even more repressive Islamist.
 
The current leaders, Iran's Ali Khamenei and Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdogan, enjoy near-absolute power and both feverishly try to hide this reality under a large and noisy apparatus of elections, parliaments, cabinets, laws and nongovernmental organizations. Both aspire to lead the entire Muslim community, perhaps someday claiming to be caliph. In an era of muted anti-Zionism from Arab states, Tehran and Ankara now lead the charge, with the Islamic Republic of Iran loudly denying the Holocaust and the Republic of Turkey comparing Israelis to Nazis.
 
In several ways, Iranians lead Turks, but the latter are catching up. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini came to power in 1979 and Mr. Erdogan in 2002. Iran has long enjoyed massive oil and gas reserves, but Turkey recently built an impressive economic base. Tehran deploys forces abroad, dominating four Arab capitals, while Ankara still fights domestic opponents, especially Gulenists and Kurds. Both governments despise the West, but Iran's is openly hostile while Turkey's formally remains in NATO and ostensibly seeks European Union membership.
 
Ayatollah Khamenei's thugs capture American sailors on the high seas while Mr. Erdogan's takes resident Americans hostage. Conspiracy theories, long an Iranian art form, have made huge strides over the past two decades in Turkey, which may now boast the region's most fantastical speculations. Both became enthusiastic allies of Venezuela's dictator, Nicolas Maduro. As a longer-established dictatorship, Ayatollah Khamenei can allow relative freedom of expression compared with Mr. Erdogan's obsessive desire to control, including what basketball players in the United States say or what travelers transiting through Istanbul airport think.
 
Their most major difference concerns the attitudes of their subjects. Whereas Ayatollah Khamenei enjoys the support of only about 15 percent of the populace, Mr. Erdogan can count on some 45 percent, affording him a legitimacy and confidence that Ayatollah Khamenei can only dream of. In part, this results from longevity under Islamist rule, in part from difference in per capita income, which is only $4,700 and stagnant in Iran, $10,700 and rising in Turkey.
 
Regime collapse in Iran is within sight and will diminish Islamism, encouraging Muslims to move toward a more modern and moderate form of their religion. The Turkish government's greater popularity and more advanced version of Islamism gives it greater staying power that makes it the more worrisome long-term opponent. Thus is the Middle East likely to witness a grand switch, with Iran on course to moderation and Turkey becoming the region's supreme danger.
 
Bilateral relations flourished during the first years of Mr. Erdogan's rule (2002-10), when they shared a Islamist worldview and a suspicion of U.S. intentions in Iraq. But relations then soured, primarily because both regimes seek foreign influence and, as neighbors, they inevitably clash. The civil war in Syria, where Tehran backs Shiite-oriented jihadis and Ankara backs Sunni jihadis, is their biggest but not only problem. Other matters also aggravate relations, such as their supporting opposing sides in Yemen, Turkish installing a NATO radar tracking Iranian activities, and Iranian support for al Qaeda against Turkey.
 
Tensions have reached the point that Ali Vaez of the International Crisis Group finds Tehran and Ankara "on a collision course." Left unchecked, he expects the present dynamics to point "toward greater bloodshed, growing instability and greater risks of direct military confrontation." More poetically, Mr. Cagaptay observes that the Middle East has room for "one shah or sultan, but not a shah and a sultan."
 
In this context, the Idlib accord looks flimsy and transient. Tehran and Ankara will probably soon turn against each other and with renewed vigor continue their perpetual rivalry.
 
 
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