The Great Middle Eastern War Of 2019
Growing tensions on Israel's northern border have raised concerns about yet another Israel-Hezbollah confrontation or a war between Israel and Iran in Syria. Such a war may not be limited to the original participants, but could involve an array of Shi'a militias and even the Assad regime, and could span the region--thereby affecting vital U.S. interests.
Two factors are driving these tensions: efforts by Hezbollah and Syria--with Iran's help--to produce highly accurate missiles in Lebanon and Syria that could cripple Israel's critical infrastructure and make life there intolerable; and Iran's efforts to transform Syria into a springboard for military operations against Israel and a platform for projecting power in the Levant.
Iran, however, while pursuing an anti-status quo agenda that has often brought it into conflict with Israel and the United States, has shown that it seeks to avoid conventional wars and consequent heavy losses to its own forces.
Instead, it relies on proxy operations, terrorism, and non-lethal shaping activities. Yet it has occasionally been willing to venture high-risk activities that entail a potential for escalation. (Example: Iranian forces in Syria launched an explosives-laden UAV into Israeli airspace in February; it was shot down, but the incident sparked a round of clashes.)
Israel also seems intent on avoiding war, though its actions show that it is willing to accept the risk of escalation to counter these emerging threats. Indeed, since 2013 it has carried out more than 130 strikes in Syria on arms shipments destined for Hezbollah, and since late 2017 it has expanded this "campaign between the wars" to target Iranian military facilities in Syria--without, thus far, sparking a wider confrontation.
Complacency is, however, unwarranted. The two major Arab-Israeli confrontations of the recent past (Lebanon 2006, Gaza 2014) resulted from unintended escalation. The emerging dynamic between Israel, Iran, and the "axis of resistance" is a formula for a third major "accident," and so deserves careful analysis.
MULTIPLE ACTORS, FRONTS, AND DOMAINS
The potential for yet another war--one of unprecedented scope and complexity--is an outcome of the Syrian civil war, which has enabled Iran to build a military infrastructure in Syria and to deploy its Shi'a "foreign legion" to Israel's borders. War is now possible on multiple fronts and in far-flung theaters, fought on land, in the air, at sea, and in information and cyber domains by fighters from Hezbollah, Iran, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and even Yemen. The widened scope of a possible war will create new military options for Iran and Hezbollah, and stretch Israeli capabilities to their limits.
Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah said as much, though perhaps with some exaggeration, when he warned in June 2017 that "if an Israeli war is launched against Syria or Lebanon it is not known that the fighting will remain Lebanese-Israeli, or Syrian-Israeli," and "this could open the way for thousands, even hundreds of thousands of fighters from all over the Arab and Islamic world to participate."
Likewise, IRGC Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari stated in November 2017 that, "The fate of the resistance front is interwoven and they all stand united, and if Israel attacks a part of it, the other component of the front will help it."
Such a war is most likely to occur as a result of unintended escalation, after another Iranian action against Israel from Syria, or after an Israeli strike in Lebanon or Syria (for example, against missile production facilities). It could start as a result of a U.S. and/or Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear program.
It might even come about as a result of a conflict that starts in the Gulf but that reaches Israel's borders--perhaps as a result of Iranian diversionary moves (much as Saddam Hussein tried in 1991 to derail the U.S. military campaign to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait by launching missiles at Israel).
A new northern war could resemble one of several scenarios:
Lebanon War Plus. A war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, in which Iranians, thousands of foreign Shi'a fighters, and even Hamas (which has established a limited military presence in southern Lebanon) also participate. The Syrian front remains relatively quiet, with Israel acting there on a limited basis to interdict the movement of fighters and capabilities into Lebanon.
War in Syria. A war between Israeli and Iranian forces, Shi'a militias (including Hezbollah fighters), and perhaps even elements of the Syrian military, fought on Syrian territory. The Lebanese front remains relatively quiet. Should Syrian ground forces get drawn into combat, however, Russia might intervene to protect its client.
A Two-Front War. A war in Lebanon and Syria between Israeli and Iranian troops, Hezbollah, Shi'a militias, and perhaps even elements of the Syrian military, in which both sides treat Lebanon and Syria as a single, unified theater of operations.
All three of these scenarios entail a potential for escalation or spillover into secondary fronts or theaters, and the involvement of additional actors:
Additional Fronts/Theaters. A war in Lebanon and/or Syria might prompt: attacks on Israel from Gaza, unrest in the West Bank, or terrorist attacks in Israel; Houthi attacks on Israeli interests (such as Israeli maritime traffic in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait), or Israeli strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen; missile attacks on Israel by Shi'a militias in Iraq, and Israeli counterstrikes. Some of these militias have already warned that the latter could trigger attacks on U.S. personnel in Iraq.
Israel vs. Iran. During fighting in Syria or Lebanon, Israel attacks Iran to strike a blow against the central pillar of the enemy coalition, and to thereby influence the course of the war. Alternatively, Iran augments attacks on Israel from Syria or Lebanon with attacks from its own territory, perhaps after suffering heavy losses in Syria. These could take the form of air or missile strikes and/or destructive cyberattacks on military targets and critical infrastructure.
A Regional War? A low-probability/high-impact scenario in which a conflict in the Levant morphs into a regional war involving Saudi Arabia and perhaps the United Arab Emirates as well. Israel responds to attacks on its critical infrastructure with air strikes or cyberattacks on Iran's oil industry or even its nuclear facilities--with the encouragement and perhaps logistical assistance of Gulf Arab states. Iran retaliates against Israel, but also conducts missile strikes, sabotage, or cyberattacks on Arab oil facilities across the Gulf, leading to escalation there, and perhaps even military intervention by the United States.
CAMPAIGN DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
For Israel, planning for and fighting the next northern war will entail unprecedented challenges, due to uncertainties regarding the number of actors involved, the potential for combat on multiple fronts, theaters, and domains (including cyber), and the role of the great powers.
Moreover, because the military capabilities of both sides and the geopolitical environment are rapidly evolving, and because Iran began its entrenchment in Syria only recently, the character of a future war will be greatly influenced by its timing. A war in 2019 might be very different from a war in 2025.
Despite these uncertainties, recent experience and current trends permit several generalizations. Israel's next northern war will be far more wide-ranging than prior conflicts. Israel may start with an intense air campaign to counter the threat of enemy rocket and missile forces and militias, but effectively dealing with this threat will require large-scale ground operations.
Israel's enemies will not be satisfied only with launching rockets and missiles at Israeli military facilities, population centers, and critical infrastructure, but they will try to use ground forces to infiltrate Israeli lines and to capture Israeli villages and small military outposts. They will also likely employ cyber warfare in support of conventional military operations (for instance, to disrupt Israeli missile defenses), and perhaps against critical infrastructure, to achieve strategic effects.
In past conflicts with Hezbollah, Israel focused on the organization's military forces, its leadership, military specialists, and elements of the Lebanese infrastructure that facilitated its operations. In the next northern war, the dilemma of whether to prioritize action against immediate threats or enemy centers of gravity and critical enablers will be acute; substantial effort needs to be invested in identifying centers of gravity that can be targeted to hasten war termination on favorable terms.
Russia is a key actor in Syria and could be a key factor in a future war: Will Moscow stand aside, or will it constrain Israel's ability to strike pro-regime forces in Syria, to prevent the unraveling of the Assad regime's post-2015 civil war gains? And will Washington remain militarily uninvolved--beyond perhaps augmenting Israeli missile defenses--or will it play a more active role, seeing this as an opportunity to strike a blow against Iran, and thereby advance its goal of undermining the latter's influence in the region?
Depending on how events play out, Israel could face a disquieting possibility: Russian efforts to thwart its use of decisive force, U.S. reticence, and ineffectual great power diplomacy could prevent Israel from achieving its full military aims--not entirely unlike the denouement of the October 1973 war. That could ensure a protracted war, and perhaps a war that ends without Israel fulfilling its aims.
CHALLENGES OF COMPLEXITY
The next northern war will require new operational concepts and a rethinking of Israel's "way of war," especially its approach to attaining military decision via defeat mechanisms tailored to its adversaries. The challenge for planners is great because they are dealing with a complex emerging threat consisting of many actors, operating on multiple fronts, with no single, well-defined center of gravity. In addition, there will be many other factors that Israeli military planners will have to consider when grappling with this complex operational environment:
Ends, Ways, and Means. Israel's war aims would likely be shaped by how a war begins and its geopolitical context. Would Israel aim to degrade enemy forces and to demoralize them? Disrupt the cohesion of the axis of resistance? Discredit the enemy's "resistance doctrine"? Destabilize Syria and/or Iran? Or simply reestablish deterrence and bring about a prolonged period of quiet? How many of these goals are attainable? Should Israel focus on Hezbollah and Nasrallah?
On Lebanese infrastructure that facilitates Hezbollah's activities? On Iran and IRGC head Soleimani? On the Shi'a militias? Or on the Assad regime? How much emphasis should be placed on targeting the enemy's field forces, military infrastructure, leadership, and motivation/morale, and how should Israel prioritize and phase these efforts?
Finally, how will Israel resolve the tension between the imperative to end its wars quickly in a way that restores deterrence--which will require it to inflict heavy damage on enemy forces that in many cases will be embedded among civilians--and its desire to avoid unnecessary escalation, as well as fulfill its obligations under the law of armed conflict?
Images of Victory. Israel has a much higher bar for success than its enemies. If the axis of resistance can disseminate images of its flags flying over captured Israeli military outposts or villages (even if subsequently retaken), land blows to Israel's critical infrastructure, and continue to launch rockets against Israel on the final day of combat, they will claim victory.
It may not be possible, however, for the axis of resistance to preserve the luster of these putative achievements in the face of significant combat losses and widespread devastation in Lebanon, Syria, and even Iran.
Scope of Operations. Israel has always tried to avoid multi-front wars that require it to split its forces. A key unknown is whether Hezbollah or Iran would try to limit or expand a conflict with Israel. Would Hezbollah eschew a fight in Lebanon to preserve its military assets there, avoid widespread destruction to the country's infrastructure, and avert a political backlash? Would Syrian forces actively participate in such a war? Would Iran encourage the Houthis to attack Israeli shipping in the Red Sea, or would the Houthis do so without being asked?
Would Hezbollah and Iran launch terrorist attacks against Israeli interests from the outset of a war, or might they try to de-escalate a potentially devastating conventional conflict in the Levant in order to launch a less risky, low-intensity terrorist "war in the shadows" against Israeli interests worldwide? And might Israel threaten to bring the war to Lebanon or Iran in order to prevent further escalation and bolster deterrence?
Hezbollah's Dilemma. Hezbollah has more than 100,000 rockets and missiles in Lebanon--sufficient to overwhelm Israeli defenses--though most are not very accurate. Iran has thousands more--though most cannot reach Israel. After seven years of civil war, Syria has relatively few missiles left--though it is trying to rebuild this capability. Hezbollah's Lebanon-based rocket and missile force is the key to achieving truly strategic effects against Israel, and a basic assumption over the past decade is that in the next war on Israel's north, Hezbollah will be the main participant.
But this may not be the case, because that would invite massive Israeli air strikes and ground operations and lead to widespread devastation in Lebanon--an outcome Hezbollah will presumably want to avoid. And so its dilemma: how to exploit the potential of its rocket and missile force without destroying Lebanon or jeopardizing this strategic asset, which may be needed later in the war to counter Israeli escalatory moves. This may be why Hezbollah (with Iran's help) is creating its own Syrian and Iraqi proxies to fight for it in the Golan--and why Israel is trying to disrupt some of these efforts.
Mobilization Potential. Only a fraction of Iran's Shi'a foreign legion is based in Syria (perhaps 10,000 to 20,000 of the nearly 200,000 foreign fighters it claims to have trained). In the event of an unanticipated war with Israel, it could take weeks for Iran to deploy available militia forces based outside of Syria, and Israel would undoubtedly interdict them en route to the front. Due to attrition and their relatively low level of training, these forces may not add much to the war effort.
Axis of Overreach? Axis of resistance members have frequently overreached (for example, Hezbollah vs. Israel in 2006, Iran vs. Israel in Syria in 2018) and they might do so again by goading Israel into yet another devastating war. This could narrow their postwar military options, unravel recent hard-won military gains of pro-regime forces in Syria, and further destabilize Lebanon and even Iran. Washington should use the specter of such outcomes to induce Russia to restrain its axis of resistance partners in wartime.
IMPLICATIONS
The next war on Israel's northern front, whether it starts in Lebanon or Syria, will not be just a more extensive and destructive replay of the 2006 Lebanon War. Developments since then ensure that such a war will likely involve many more actors, a much larger theater of operations, unprecedented challenges for escalation management, warfighting, and war termination--and the possibility of a regional conflagration.
The complexity of the emerging operational environment demands detailed analysis of its implications for the United States and Israel through wargaming, red-teaming, and joint planning efforts; the development of new Israeli operational concepts; the proper prioritization and phasing of military operations and the identification and targeting of enemy centers of gravity; and an active U.S. diplomatic and military posture to ensure that a potentially devastating local war does not become a destabilizing and destructive regional conflict.
That said, the foregoing assessment suggests several ways that the United States and Israel can shape the operational environment to enhance the odds of an outcome compatible with their shared interests with respect to Iran and its axis of resistance, should war come:
Play on Iran's Escalation Aversion. Iran generally seeks to avoid or deter conventional wars, and is sensitive to threats to the regime and the homeland. Accordingly, U.S. and Israeli decision-makers should use the potential for escalation inherent in a possible northern war to deter Iran from actions that could lead to such a conflict in the first place, or its spread to Iran--which could jeopardize Iran's vital economic interests (if, for example, its oil infrastructure were to be hit), and the stability of the Assad regime in Syria.
Support Israel's "Campaign Between the Wars" in Syria. Israeli attempts to disrupt Iran's military build-up in Syria have already sparked clashes there. Yet such efforts might reduce the need for Israeli preventive action in a crisis, the potential for escalation in wartime, and the amount of damage wrought in a future war.
The U.S. government should support these efforts, and reinforce Israeli diplomacy with Russia to preserve Israeli military freedom of action in Syria. It should also quietly indicate to Russia that a war in Syria might jeopardize Moscow's recent military achievements there, by encouraging surviving Syrian rebel groups to resume their fight against an enfeebled Assad regime.
Keep Hezbollah "Out." Because of the size of its rocket and missile arsenal and its ground forces, keeping the bulk of Hezbollah's forces out of a northern war and preventing such a war from spreading to Lebanon may greatly facilitate efforts to prevent a limited local war from becoming a much bigger war, and from perhaps sparking a regional conflagration.
Keep U.S. Forces "In" Syria. The presence of even a small U.S. military contingent in northeastern Syria might discourage pro-Iranian Shi'a militias from moving through these areas to the front with Israel during wartime, and limit their movement to a few roads in southeastern Syria--thereby facilitating their interdiction by Israel. For this and a host of other reasons, the U.S. military should retain a limited ground presence in northeastern Syria.
Foster Arab-Israeli Cooperation. The possibility of war between Israel, Iran, and its axis of resistance raises questions about covert or tacit contributions by various Arab states to a common war effort. Washington should encourage quiet military coordination and cooperation between Israel and these states, which could greatly complicate war-planning and warfighting for Iran and its proxies.
Ending the War. Conflict termination has posed challenges in recent Arab-Israeli conflicts, and the multiplicity of actors with diverse interests involved in a northern front war will make this even more complicated than before. After the Cold War, the great powers no longer felt a need to intervene to prevent the defeat of their clients or to avoid a superpower confrontation.
Russia is back in Syria, however, and it might or might not decide to constrain Israel or its partners in the axis of resistance. Russian behavior, even if somewhat ambiguous in practice, could ensure that the next war will be a long one. The challenge for U.S. and Israeli diplomacy is to arrive at sustainable understandings with Russia to ensure that it plays a constructive role during the next war, and in efforts to end it. Russia may prove neither willing nor able to do so, but it would be irresponsible not to explore the possibilities.
This reality further underscores the need for Israel to develop viable operational concepts, new "ways of war," and credible defeat mechanisms, so that it can decide and terminate future wars on its own terms. And it highlights the need for the United States to remain engaged in the region so that if war comes, it can ensure that Israel has the freedom of action to achieve its war aims, and thereby advance U.S. interests in countering and curtailing Iranian influence in the region.
Massive Missile Attack on Israel after Qatar Funds Hamas - by Bassam Tawil -
Last week, as efforts were underway to achieve a new truce between Hamas and Israel, this author asked a legitimate and straightforward question: Can Hamas be trusted?
The conclusion was that a real truce between Israel and Hamas can be achieved only after the Palestinian jihadi terrorists are removed from power, and not rewarded for violence and threats.
Days later, Hamas itself provided proof as to why it cannot be trusted with any deal, including a truce.
Since yesterday, Hamas and its allies in the Gaza Strip have been firing hundreds of rockets into Israel. The current barrage began hours after Hamas terrorists attacked Israeli commandos inside the Gaza Strip, killing an Israeli officer and moderately wounding a soldier. In response, the Israeli army killed seven terrorists, including a top Hamas military commander -- Sheikh Nur Baraka.
The Israeli commando unit was not inside the Gaza Strip to kill or kidnap anyone. They were there as part of a routine covert operation to foil terrorist attacks by Hamas and other Palestinian terror groups. The commandos, all the same, were attacked by Hamas terrorists who did try to kill or kidnap some of them. The soldiers of the elite Israeli unit managed to return to Israel under the cover of Israeli airstrikes called in to aid their exfiltration.
What is clear is that it was Hamas, not Israel, that initiated the armed clash with the Israeli force. It was Hamas that attacked the Israeli soldiers, killed the officer, and then rushed to accuse Israel of launching a "new aggression" against the Gaza Strip. When the Israeli soldiers tried to defend themselves and killed seven terrorists with return fire, Hamas accused Israel of committing a "despicable crime" against Palestinians.
It is worth noting that the Hamas attack on the Israeli commandos came hours after a Qatari envoy left the Gaza Strip. The Qatari official, Mohammed El-Amadi, had arrived in the Gaza Strip last week carrying suitcases stuffed with $15 million in cash. The money was delivered to Hamas leaders so that they could pay salaries to thousands of their employees in the Gaza Strip. The Qatari financial grant was delivered to the Gaza Strip with Israel's approval. The Qatari envoy even entered the Gaza Strip through Israel's Erez border crossing.
Why did Israel facilitate the transfer of the Qatari cash to the Gaza Strip? Israel has been -- and still is -- trying to avoid an all-out war with Hamas.
Israel is not afraid of Hamas. Israel simply does not want the Palestinian civilians living under Hamas rule in the Gaza Strip to pay another heavy price for the foolish acts of their leaders. Israel, in fact, has repeatedly expressed a desire to alleviate the suffering of the Palestinians there.
In recent years, Israel has been actively working to support reconstruction efforts in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli measures include the upgrading of the border crossings between Israel and Gaza to more than 800 truckloads of building materials and other goods to enter Gaza on a daily basis, and facilitating the passage of more than 3.4 million tons of materials into Gaza since the 2014 war between Israel and Hamas.
Earlier this year, Israel presented to the EU, US, UN, and the World Bank various projects that were approved by the Israeli government to develop infrastructure in the Gaza Strip, promote energy solutions and create employment opportunities for the Palestinians there.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu defended last week's deal with Qatar by saying it was aimed at preventing a "humanitarian crisis" in the Gaza Strip. Netanyahu said that he would do "whatever I can" to keep Israelis living in communities adjacent to the border with Gaza safe, while at the same time working to prevent a humanitarian crisis.
Hamas took Qatar's $15 million cash grant, paid its employees, and days later has resumed its terrorist attacks against Israel.
This is Hamas's way of saying thank you to the Qataris and Israelis who have been working hard to reach a truce in the Gaza Strip and avoid another war -- one that is likely to cause more suffering to the two million Palestinians living there.
Hamas has clearly interpreted the goodwill gesture of Israel and Qatar as a sign of weakness. Hamas leaders have even gone on the record as saying that the $15 million grant was the "fruit" of the weekly violent riots that it has been organizing along the border with Israel since March. Shortly after the Qatari envoy delivered the grant to the Gaza Strip, Hamas spokesman Fawzi Barhoum used those very words: he boasted that the Palestinians were finally reaping the fruits of their violent protests along the Gaza-Israel border.
Hamas's stance is reminiscent of its reaction to the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005. Then, Hamas and other Palestinians also interpreted the Israeli "disengagement" from the Gaza Strip -- intended to give Gaza the chance to become a Singapore on the Mediterranean -- as a sign of Israeli weakness and retreat.
A few months later, Hamas even won the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary election -- largely because it claimed that it had forced Israel to pull out of the Gaza Strip by conducting suicide bombings and rocket attacks. Hamas told Palestinians back then: vote for us because we drove the Jews out of the Gaza Strip through the armed struggle.
The renewed Hamas attacks on Israel serve as a reminder that the terrorist group is not interested in a real truce. Hamas wants millions of dollars paid to its employees so that it can continue to prepare for war with Israel while not having to worry about the welfare of its people.
Qatar's $15 million cash grant has failed to stop Hamas from launching hundreds of rockets into Israel. On the contrary, the money has only emboldened Hamas and increased its appetite to continue its jihad to eliminate Israel. All the money in the world will not convince Hamas to abandon its ideology or soften its position toward Israel.
If Hamas is in fact interested in a truce, it is not because it wants peace with Israel. Rather, it is because Hamas needs "breathing space" that will allow it to continue developing and amassing weapons, and preparing for more attacks on Israel. Anyone who puts his or her faith in Hamas tempering its objectives is living in an illusion.
Hamas has a long-standing tradition of violating ceasefires with Israel.
Even if the Egyptians, Qataris and the UN manage to end the latest attacks on Israel, Hamas will never abandon its plan to destroy Israel and kill as many Jews as possible. Hamas will continue to violate ceasefires. If Qatar fulfills its promise to send more suitcases stuffed with millions of dollars to the Gaza Strip, Hamas will continue to laugh all the way to the bank.
What the international mediators need to understand is that there is only one solution to the crisis in the Gaza Strip: removing Hamas from power and destroying its military capabilities. They also need to understand that there is only one language that Hamas understands: the language of force. Until the mediators internalize this reality, Hamas will continue to make a mockery of everyone, including its own people and those who are trying to prevent a humanitarian disaster there. The assumption that if you pay terrorists millions of dollars they will stop attacking you -- rather than using the funds to build up their forces -- has proven to be false.
Iran Opens a War Against Israel from Gaza - Caroline Glick -
A Kornet anti-tank missile hit a civilian bus transporting Israeli soldiers adjacent to Israel's border with Gaza at 4:30 in the afternoon on Monday.
According to the bus driver, 50 Israeli soldiers had alighted the bus just moments before it was hit by the missile. The missile struck while the bus was moving slowly towards a parking lot. One soldier, who was standing next to the bus, was critically wounded in the blast.
Immediately after the missile strike against the bus, Hamas and its partner, Islamic Jihad, initiated the largest bombardment of Israel they had ever undertaken from Gaza. By late Tuesday morning, the two terror groups had fired more than 400 projectiles into Israel. Fifty Israelis were wounded in the onslaught. One person was killed when a mortar hit an apartment building in Ashkelon. Hundreds of mortars and rockets and missiles were intercepted by Israel's Iron Dome anti-missile batteries. And the government announced it was rushing more Iron Dome batteries to the area.
In the hours following the joint Hamas-Islamic Jihad assault, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman (who stepped down Wednesday) ordered the Israel Air Force (IAF) to carry out a large-scale air assault against Hamas command posts and other facilities in the Gaza Strip.
In a media briefing, a senior Air Force commander said the IAF strikes since Monday night have been the most far-reaching raids Israel has ever conducted in Gaza. More than a hundred targets were hit in under two hours, he said.
Israel's Security Cabinet, which is authorized to order the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to open large-scale operations, including war, convened on Tuesday morning. Its final decision was to walk back the conflict and agree to a ceasefire, with no terms.
The cabinet's decision was met with fury by residents of the south. They came out in droves, blocked a major highway leading to the embattled border town of Sderot, and set fire to tires while attacking the government for opting not to go to war against Hamas.
Defense Minister Liberman held a press conference Wednesday afternoon announcing his resignation in protest against the decision to walk away from the conflict.
Netanyahu, for his part, defended the government's decision in a speech on Wednesday morning. With Liberman's resignation imminent, Netanyahu said that he was acting on information about Israel's enemies that he cannot share with the public. And he insisted that Israel would take action to defeat them at a time and in a manner of its choosing.
What might he have been talking about?
In all likelihood, he was talking about Iran.
To understand the role Iran is playing in Gaza, it is important to take a close look at the missile strike against the bus on Monday.
Hamas terrorists in Gaza filmed the blast. According to Israel's Hadashot news network's veteran Arab affairs commentator, Ehud Ya'ari, the footage of the blast was first broadcast on Iranian television in Lebanon and only later rebroadcast on Palestinian television.
This is highly significant. The initial Iranian broadcast indicates that Hamas and Islamic Jihad are not independent actors in their aggression against Israel. Rather, they are Iranian proxies. They receive their orders from Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps and Iran's Lebanese army, Hezbollah. And they report to their Iranian and Lebanese commanders.
When Hamas and Islamic Jihad go to war against Israel from Gaza, they do so not merely because they have become convinced that Israel will go to great lengths to avoid a major military operation against Gaza that would require the IDF to deploy large numbers of military forces and assets to Gaza. (Although surely their awareness of Israel's deep-seated desire to avoid another major war with Hamas-Islamic Jihad in Gaza empowers them to attack.)
And they shower Israel with missiles, rockets, and mortars merely because by agreeing to enable Qatar to transfer cash and fuel to Gaza to keep the Hamas regime afloat to secure a ceasefire, Israel showed Hamas that it can be extorted. (Although the knowledge that Israel is willing to be extorted to avoid war certainly also played into the Hamas-Islamic Jihad's decision to attack Israel.)
The main reason Hamas and Islamic Jihad attacked Israel is because Iran told them to do so.
So when Israel decides not to take the bait but rather accepts a humiliating and - in an election year - politically costly ceasefire, we have to think about the relative balance of power today between Israel and Iran.
Outside of Lebanon, which Iran effectively controls through Hezbollah, Iran's chief area of operations in Israel's neighborhood is Syria, where Iran has been going from strength to strength. With each passing day, the Russian- and Iranian-Hezbollah-controlled regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad reasserts and reinforces its control over much of Syrian territory. As it does so, the threat of a major war that will pit Israel against Hezbollah forces in Lebanon, and against Hezbollah, Iranian, and Syrian forces operating under Russian protection in Syria, rises.
Gaza plays a role here, as it has in the past, because if Israel is sucked into deploying large numbers of forces to Gaza to fight Hamas, it will leave its Northern Front vulnerable. That is precisely what happened in the summer of 2006.
One of the most forgotten aspects of Israel's 2006 war against Hezbollah in Lebanon is that it began in Gaza. Two weeks before Hezbollah opened hostilities against Israel by attacking a military patrol along the border, killing eight IDF reserve soldiers and stealing the bodies of two of the dead, Hamas carried out a similar operation in southern Israel.
On June 25, 2006, a combined force of terrorists from Hamas and the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) Fatah faction entered Israel from Gaza through an underground tunnel. They reached an IDF position along the border and attacked a sleeping tank crew. Two soldiers were killed, and three were wounded. One of the wounded, Cpl. Gilad Shalit, was captured and taken to Gaza.
Following the cross-border attack, Hamas and its terrorist allies carried out a large-scale bombardment of Israel with mortar and rocket fire.
Israel deployed a large number of ground and air forces to Gaza. So when Hezbollah attacked two-and-a-half weeks later, Israel was far more vulnerable than it would otherwise have been.
There are two main reasons that the prospect of war between Israel and Iran-Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria has grown. First, Iran is interested in fighting before U.S. sanctions drive it into bankruptcy. And second, Russia's recent turn towards Iran and Hezbollah and away from Israel has emboldened Tehran.
Until September 17, Russian President Vladimir Putin was sitting on the fence, with everything concerning Russian relations with Israel on the one hand, and Russian relations with Iran-Hezbollah on the other hand. Until September 17, Putin was interested in preventing an Iranian war against Israel even as he enabled Iran to assert control over Syrian through Hezbollah and the Assad regime. To thatw end, while fighting with Iran to secure Assad's continued hold on power, he agreed to a coordination mechanism with Israel that enabled Israel to attack Iranian targets in Syria that directly threatened Israel. According to the Israeli government, in the 12 months preceding September 17, Israel carried out more than 200 airstrikes - or more than 4 strikes a week - against Iranian targets in Syria.
On September 17, Russia abruptly changed its posture. That day, Syrian forces manning an S-200 surface to air missile battery in Damascus accidentally downed a Russian spy plane.
Rather than blame the incompetent Syrian forces that indiscriminately shot off missiles that downed their plane, the Russians blamed Israel, which had completed a strike in Syria 15 minutes before the Russian jet was downed.
Russia's seemingly irrational assault on Israel, blaming it for an action undertaken by Syria, was a calculated move. By attacking Israel, Russia was able to use the episode as a means to end its tactical cooperation with Israel in Syria and swing entirely to Iran's side.
Russia moved rapidly to complete its pivot to Iran.
Right after the Syrians shot down the Russian plane, the Russian Defense Ministry announced that it was deploying the more advanced S-300 surface to air missile system in Damascus. Barely a week later, the S-300 landed at Russia's Khmeimim air base in Syria and was quickly assembled and deployed.
According to media reports, Israel has severely constrained its air activities in Syria since Russia delivered the S-300 battery. In the meantime, Iran has continued and stepped up its missile shipments to Hezbollah through the Damascus airport.
Last week, Israel carried out a major air exercise with the Greek air force. According to Israeli media reports, the purpose of the exercise was to train pilots to operate in the presence of an S-300 battery. Greece fields an S-300 system.
Since September 17, Netanyahu has tried on multiple occasions to meet with Putin, only to be rebuffed. Netanyahu met with Putin briefly in Paris over the weekend. The Israeli media reported that their brief exchange provoked Netanyahu to brief his cabinet that "the crisis with Putin is far worse than we thought."
President Donald Trump was scheduled to meet with Putin in Paris. But shortly before Trump left for Paris, the meeting was postponed until November 30.
Given the inflamed situation in the north, Russia's betrayal and Iran's clear interest in provoking a two-front war, Netanyahu's rationale for accepting the politically damaging and humiliating ceasefire with Hamas becomes clear. The main reason that Israel has gone to such great lengths to avoid a major conflict with Hamas is because it is mainly concerned with Hezbollah and Iran in the north. The IDF and the government have no interest in deploying thousands of troops to Gaza, where they will be unavailable to fight in the north when they are needed.
Presumably, Netanyahu is hoping that Trump will succeed where he has apparently failed in weakening Russia's sudden determination to stand with Iran against Israel. Presumably he is hoping to delay major action against Hamas-Hezbollah-Iran until circumstances are less propitious for Iran both economically and militarily.
But as the missile attack on the bus, and Hamas's unprecedented, ferocious rocket assault on southern Israel showed, the longer Israel waits to strike its enemies, the more powerful they become. So the longer Israel delays action, the more difficult it will be for it to defeat its enemies in a strategically significant way.
And as Lieberman's resignation and the protests against the government from the beleaguered and infuriated residents of southern Israel demonstrate, the political price of delaying the inevitable may become prohibitive for Netanyahu and his political partners in his coalition government.
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