Egypt and Middle East Peace, Positive and Negative - Caroline Glick - https://www.breitbart.com/middle-east/2019/04/03/caroline-glick-egypt-and-middle-east-peace-positive-and-negative/
Next week, Egyptian President Sisi will arrive in Washington for a critical meeting with President Donald Trump. The meeting is considered a preparatory step towards the administration's rollout of its peace plan for Israel and the Palestinians, which Trump has dubbed, "the deal of the century."
The deal is critical to Sisi, who is seeking U.S. support for his bid to amend Egypt's constitution in a manner that will allow him to lead the country indefinitely. It is critical to prospects of security and lasting peace in the Middle East as well. To understand why, it is worth considering an event that occurred forty years ago last week.
Last week marked the 40th anniversary of the signing of the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt on March 26, 1979. In Israel, the commemorations of the event were
In Egypt, the peace deal's anniversary was ignored.
On the face of it, the absence of official commemorations in either Israel or Egypt is strange. The Egyptian-Israeli peace has long been touted as a watershed event - just as important as, if not more important than, the Islamic revolution in Iran that occurred a month before the peace was concluded.
Until the Khomeinst revolution, Iran had been Israel's strategic ally and America's strongest ally in the Islamic world. The revolution transformed Iran into their most fanatical enemy. By the same token, until it concluded its peace treaty with Israel, Egypt was Israel's worst enemy. It had also served as the Soviet Union's most powerful Cold War ally against the U.S. in the Middle East.
By making peace with Israel, then-Egyptian President Anwar Sadat ended Egypt's state of war with Israel and transformed Egypt into the pillar of America's alliance system in the Arab world.
Moreover, at the time, the peace treaty Egypt concluded with Israel was viewed as the basis for a wider regional peace between Israel and all of its Arab neighbors.
Forty years later, Iran continues to be the foremost foe facing America and Israel. But the promise of peace between Israel and the Arab world that Sadat seemed to carry in his suit pocket at the time disappeared. According to survey data, the Egyptian people hate Israel and Jews more than the Iranian people do.
True, Israel has close strategic relations with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah A-Sisi's regime. According to Israeli sources, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Israeli security services were instrumental in facilitating Sisi's seizure of power from the Muslim Brotherhood regime of then-Egyptian President Mohamad Morsi in 2013. Israel went to great lengths to win U.S. and international support for the Sisi regime. Israel has also plays a major role in assisting the Sisi regime fight Islamic State terror forces in the Sinai peninsula.
On the other hand, aside from a few partnership and business deals between Israeli business moguls and people at the highest levels of the Egyptian state, there are no real commercial ties between Israelis and Egyptians.
Tourism from Egypt to Israel is all but non-existent. This owes in large part to the Egyptian government's policy, which requires Egyptian citizens who wish to travel to Israel to receive permission for their travel from the Egyptian government first. In most cases, the requests are denied, and Egyptians who request to travel to Israel incur significant professional and social costs for their action.
Israelis are also not eager to visit Egypt. Egypt's endemic antisemitism makes the prospect of terrorism palpable. In 1985 and 1990, Israeli tourists in Egypt were deliberately targeted and massacred by Egyptian terrorists. The attacker in 1985 was an Egyptian soldier. Other Egyptian security forces who arrived at the scene denied medical assistance to the wounded, causing the victims, including children, to bleed to death.
These attacks, Egypt's endemic hatred of Jews, and the constant threat of ISIS terror attacks against tourists in the Sinai have deterred most Israelis from travelling to Egyptian territory.
Egypt's rejection of normalized relations with Israel stands at the base of Israel's continued concern over Egypt. During Israel's current elections campaign, those concerns were thrust into the limelight. In late March, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's chief political rivals accused him of committing treason for not objecting to Germany's decision to sell submarines to Egypt in 2015. The allegations themselves are absurd. But the fact they were made demonstrated how concerned Israelis remain about the potential threat of renewed Egyptian aggression.
Major General Gershon Hacohen, a former commander of the Israel Defense Force's war colleges, argues that the peace treaty exacerbated Israel's security burden along its southern border.
"We fielded two divisions in the south before the peace. We field two divisions in the south today - one for Gaza and the other for Egypt," he told Breitbart News.
And despite the fact that the size of the force is identical on paper, practically speaking, it has grown.
Hacohen explained, "Before the peace, we fielded armored divisions. An armored brigade is comprised of just 450 soldiers. Today we have infantry divisions. Just a battalion of infantry has 450 soldiers. So the manpower requirements to defend against Egypt are even higher than they were before we concluded the peace deal with Sadat."
Deploying forces along the border is just part of the security burden Egypt poses for Israel. There is also static border protection, both along the border with Egypt and along the border with Gaza.
As Hacohen noted, "We spent billions of shekels to build the border fence to prevent infiltrations from Egypt. And we are currently executing a multi-billion shekel operation to construct a subterranean border wall to prevent tunneling activities from Gaza. Whatever you want to say about the nature of the peace with Egypt, we certainly do not view the border as a peaceful frontier."
The connection between Egypt and the Gaza Strip is more than geography.
As Israeli military affairs commentator Alon Ben David wrote recently in the Hebrew-language Israeli newspaper Maariv, the humanitarian situation in Gaza is heartbreaking. Hamas has used all of Gaza's resources to build its war machine against Israel while destroying Gaza's natural resources. There is effectively no potable water in Gaza. There are no economic opportunities in Gaza. Unemployment is endemic. While Israel places no restrictions on the importation of non-military materiel to Gaza, Gazans lack the funds to purchase food and other vital commodities.
The situation has grown so desperate that in recent weeks, Gazans risked their lives to protest against Hamas, only to be violently suppressed.
It is the desperation of the residents of Gaza that enables Hamas to draw thousands to the border with Israel to serve as human shields and fodder for its snipers. Ben David wrote that Hamas gives chocolate to participants and pays the wounded anywhere from 15 and 60 dollars, depending on the severity of their injuries.
Last week, IDF forces at the Gaza border apprehended two eight-year-old boys armed with knives who infiltrated Israel from Gaza. The children were returned home. They told the Israeli soldiers that they wanted to be sent to prison. As Ben David explained, Palestinians infiltrate Israel with knives so that they can go to prison, where they will be fed, given clean water, and provided with showers and beds.
The only long-term solution to the security and humanitarian threat posed by Hamas-ruled Gaza is for Egypt to permit Gazans to work in northern Sinai. Although Egypt has recently allowed a limited number of Gazans to cross into its territory, the border remains largely sealed.
Egypt's actions are motivated by both practical and strategic considerations. The practical considerations can be addressed easily. The strategic rationale for Egypt's behavior is the root of Gaza's permanent distress and the reason Egypt's peace with Israel is of such limited strategic significance.
In a recent article in Israel Hayom, Hacohen explained that since ancient times, Gaza has never been able to support itself in isolation from an external commercial and population hub. In the 1967 Six Day War, Israel took control of the Sinai Peninsula and the adjacent Gaza Strip from Egypt. The two operated as a unitary economic, military and sociological unit.
In the framework of the peace negotiations, Israel accepted Egypt's demand to restore Egyptian control over the Sinai. Since Gaza was attached to Sinai geographically, economically, sociologically and politically, then-Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin offered Sadat to cede control over Gaza to Egypt as well. Sadat refused to accept it.
Citing then-Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weitzman, who was one of the senior negotiators in the peace talks with Egypt, Hacohen explained that Sadat's motive for refusing Gaza was entirely hostile to Israel. It was only after the peace was concluded that Begin understood that Sadat had played him for a fool.
Weitzman claimed that Sadat insisted that Israel retain control over Gaza, while isolating Gaza from its economic hub in the Sinai because he wanted to harm Israel. In isolation from Sinai, Gaza suddenly became "Palestinian." Its residents became part of a larger "Palestinian" problem that also included Judea and Samaria - the non-adjacent area along Israel's border with Jordan. By detaching Gaza from Egypt and attaching it politically to Judea and Samaria, Sadat made the Palestinian conflict with Israel insoluble.
In light of Egypt's dual role as both the first Arab state to make peace with Israel and the source of Gaza's chronic instability and security menace, it would be reasonable for President Trump to focus on two issues in his meeting with Sisi. First, he should urge Sisi to reintegrate Gaza and northern Sinai economically. Doing so would ease the suffering of the people of Gaza, and radically diminish Hamas's ability to exploit the civilian population as human shields in its war against Israel.
Second, Trump should point out that as it did in 1979, Egypt holds the keys to peace in the Middle East. If Sisi permits Gaza to reintegrate into the Sinai and so saves the people of Gaza from misery and poverty under Hamas's jihadist jackboot, and if Sisi normalizes his country's relations with Israel by promoting acceptance of Jews and the Jewish state, he will expand the prospects for Middle East peace in a way that a hundred peace plans and summits never can.
Russia grabs the reins on Mideast peace - Micky Aharonson - http://www.israelhayom.com/opinions/russia-is-grabbing-the-reins-on-mideast-peace/
In one of his first comments as Palestinian Authority Prime Minister, Mohammed Shtayyeh said other countries, chief among them Russia, would support Palestinian rejection of the Trump administration's "deal of the century" for Israeli-Palestinian peace. It wasn't for nothing that Shtayyeh highlighted Russia.
In recent years, Russia has expressed an interest in getting involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, due to its own regional and global interests of restoring its status as a superpower. Hence Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov recently refloated the idea of hosting talks between Israel and the Palestinians in Moscow. Over the years, Moscow has on multiple occasions proposed advancing a peace agreement via a Moscow summit, but Israel has preferred to let the United States spearhead the process. The current Russian interest in the conflict is a reflection of Moscow's ambitions to establish a presence in the Middle East as a mediator, within the prism of a zero-sum game against the Americans, and amid the view that U.S. clout on the Arab street is waning. Russia, from its perspective, assumes this activity is only beneficial: The cost, in any practical or abstract sense, is insignificant, and the expected returns of restoring Russia to prominence in the Arab and Muslim world are self-evident to the Kremlin.
Russia also illustrates its desire to be a mediator on the global stage by saying and doing certain things to paint itself as a critical cog in any peace process. This always occurs simultaneous to, or immediately after, the Americans unveil their own initiatives. In 2017, for example, as talks were progressing over moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem, Russia announced its desire, as a member of the Quartet, to advance a peace deal. At the time, Russia issued a surprise declaration that it recognizes west Jerusalem as the official capital of Israel, regardless of the establishment of a Palestinian capital in east Jerusalem. The Kremlin also supported direct talks between Israel and the Palestinians and expressed its interest in facilitating an agreement. The declaration emphasized Russia as a key player due to its membership in the Quartet and its permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. Lavrov also denounced the "deal of the century" and stressed Russia's commitment to a peace deal based on U.N. resolutions and the Arab peace initiative.
In recent months, as the American "deal of the century" has gained more exposure, Moscow has intensified its efforts to advance intra-Palestinian reconciliation, including repeatedly inviting Palestinian factions for talks in Moscow. Hamas is shunned to varying degrees by the U.S. and European Union, and Russia wants to signal it can hold dialogue with the PA and the regime in Gaza.
Last month, for instance, Hamas representatives flew to Moscow and were given the opportunity to present an alternative solution to the conflict. Among the principles put forth were the rejection of the "deal of the century" and opposition to any form of normalization with Israel. Although these principles are irrelevant to negotiations with Israel, voicing them in Russia strengthens the narrative that Moscow is grabbing the reins as the only mediator capable of communicating with all the Palestinian factions, especially when they are all united in opposing the "deal of the century."
The United States and Israel must assume from past experience that as the "deal of the century" approaches its deadline, two processes will take place. First, we can assume that ignoring Russia will provoke a Russian attempt to enlist an Arab and international lobby against the U.S. proposal. Additionally, Russia will advance its own alternatives for resolving the conflict, which the Palestinians can view as a basis for negotiations, such as the summit in Moscow, the Quartet path or any other platform that will include Russia as a member of the international "club."
This situation makes it increasingly likely for a scenario to unfold in which Israel, not the Palestinians, is painted as the rejectionist side, particularly in light of the fact that a plan such as the one presented by Hamas in Moscow in completely unfeasible from Israel's perspective. In all likelihood, if it were possible to establish an international framework for a peace accord, which would include Russia, such as the Quartet, it would probably rise to the forefront. Because, among other things, Russia has expanded its leverage with the Arab world and it very much wants to partake in the prestigious "club" of nations.
The Duplicitous Double Standard Of The UN Towards Israel - By Sarah N. Stern -
There are 194 nations in the world. Out of those, precisely 193 acquired their territory through the use of military force. That is how borders have traditionally been drawn. Most of these campaigns were offensive.
I have asked many military experts, historians and scholars about this, and they have, to a person, told me that there is only one nation in the world who gained territory through the use of force that has been sued, time and time again to relinquish that territory. You guessed it: the state of Israel.
What is so profoundly outrageous about this is that Israel acquired lands in defensive wars. It is not as though Israel is a colonial state that set out to acquire land to enrich itself. Israel acquired the Golan Heights in an act of self-defense when they had been attacked on all sides in the 1967 war, and managed to successfully retain this land in the 1973 war.
Syria is a failed state. We have seen how the eight-year-old brutal Syrian civil war at the hands of Bashar Assad has left at least a half a million of his own people dead, and 5.6 million refugees along with 6.8 million internally displaced persons.
According to a recent article in Commentary by the legal scholar Vivian Bercovici, "Since World War II, the accepted understanding of international law that involves territorial loss during conflict is quite straightforward: The attacking nation may not retain permanently land acquired as a result of armed conflict."
For those who are objecting to this move: Kindly inform us of with whom, precisely, Israel is supposed to negotiate with? Let's take a look at the players inside Syria. Bashir Assad of the rump state of Syria? Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, the head of ISIS in the Levant? Qassam Solomeini of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps that works hand in glove with Bashir Assad? Hassan Nasrallah of Hezbollah, who now has approximately several thousand troops in Syria?
The reality on the ground is that the 400 square miles of the Golan Heights is the demarcation line of a Hobbesian state of war of "man against man" and a relatively tranquil, democratic area.
The political reality within Israel is that every Israeli, right, left and center agrees that the Golan Heights is critical for the survival of Israel. General Giora Eiland stated that "There is no solution to Israel's survival without the retention of the Golan Heights."
Every Israeli knows that whoever controls the high ground of the Golan Heights controls the security of the area. Most of us have stood on the Heights, and have peered down into Damascus and Beirut. We know it affords a protective shield extending all the way down to Lake Tiberias.
And the Israeli intelligence and military officials up there are the "eyes and ears" for vital intelligence and military information that they willingly share with the United States.
Words matter. By framing the language of the Golan Heights as "Occupied Territory", it whets the appetite of Israel's enemies, and indicates to them that this region is still in play.
That is why it is no less than infuriating when 14 nations of the UN Security Council met on Wednesday, at the request of Syria, to condemn America's recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights.
Would any of these distinguished representatives ever subject their own citizens of their nations to the uncertainty of "trading land for peace" if they had such wolves banging at their gates?
As I have written many times in the past, the birth of Israel was supposed to have been the denouement of the age-old problem of anti-Semitism. Instead, it is the focal point for all of the anti-Semites.
And many of them are distinguished representatives wearing suits and ties, casting votes in the United Nations.
The Importance of the Golan Heights - Matthew R.J. Brodsky -
Analysis: Jerusalem is likely to keep treating Syria as an extension of Iranian territory
Like the decision to move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, President Donald Trump's recent recognition of Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights came as a surprise to many, even if the matter had already gathered steam on Capitol Hill in recent years. It was one of the least publicly discussed aspects of Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu's first meeting with Trump at the White House in February 2017. So why is the Golan so important?
The Golan Heights and the area Israel came to occupy from Syria in 1967 is a rocky, elevated plateau that ranges in height from 400 to 1,700 feet. Mount Hermon in the north marks the high point, standing at 9,232 feet tall, and it contains an Israel Defense Forces strategic observation post. The Golan also overlooks the Sea of Galilee and the Hula Valley, which is Israel's richest agricultural land. Two of the main water sources for the Jordan River-the Dan and the Banias-come from the slopes of Mt. Hermon. Damascus is only 40 miles away from the Israeli-held territory.
Israel captured the Golan Heights from Syria during the June 1967 War-the same war where Israel took the Sinai from Egypt, and the West Bank and Gaza from Jordan and Egypt respectively. The territory that came under Israeli control represented less than 1 percent of Syrian land area, yet under Syria's control it served as a forward operating position where artillery regularly shelled northern Israel, and the Palestinian Fatah organization launched regular cross-border raids. Israel annexed the territory in 1981, but the international community didn't recognize the move.
An opening for Middle East peace came in November 1977 when, in an unprecedented move, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat spoke before the Israeli Knesset and created what became known as the land-for-peace formula in negotiations with Israel. Shortly thereafter, Egypt and Israel made peace, and Israel returned the Sinai Peninsula.
In March 1991, President George H. W. Bush told Congress, "The time has come to put an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict." The United States emerged as the world's sole superpower in the aftermath of the first Gulf war and sought to capitalize on the moment. The goal was to convene a regional meeting or conference designed to comprehensively settle the Arab-Israeli dispute based on U.N. Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, which were passed in the wake of the 1967 and 1973 wars respectively.
Long considered the roadmap for Middle East peace, resolution 242 called for the "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" to "secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." It also spoke of the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force." The resolution, however, didn't provide a formula for the depth of an Arab peace offer or the amount of territory Israel would return.
The Bush administration's Madrid Conference in 1991 paved the path for separate peace tracks between Israel, Jordan, Syria, and the Palestinians, during the Clinton administration. Having given up its claim in 1988 on what became known as the West Bank (as it was on the west bank of the Jordan River), Jordan became the second Arab state to make peace with Israel in 1994.
When Israel began negotiations with Syria shortly after the Madrid Conference, the assumption was that a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights meant an Israeli withdrawal to the 1923 international border. Throughout the 1990s, however, Syria's territorial demands expanded. Syrian president Hafez al-Assad wanted a "full withdrawal," including the caveat that the pullout should be "to the June 4, 1967 line." He also added the requirement of Syrian "access to the Sea of Galilee." By 2000, Assad insisted upon "shared sovereignty over the lake."
There are several differences between the 1923 international border that Britain and France drew between their mandates and the June 4, 1967 line. The 1923 border was drawn so that all the Sea of Galilee would be within Britain's mandate, which later became Israel. On the other hand, the June 4, 1967 line was a situation, not a border. It exists on no official map. It was simply where the Israeli and Syrian forces were positioned on the eve of the 1967 war. The difference between the two amounted to 25 square miles.
The disparity in what would constitute a full Israeli withdrawal can still be seen today in how the territory is accounted for. According to Syria, the total area of the Golan Heights occupied by Israel is 580 square miles. Israel claims it is closer to 500 square miles. For its part, the CIA World Factbook puts the number far closer to Israel's view.
Whereas Syria was focused on maximizing the amount of territory it could regain in a peace agreement, Israel was focused on another key component created by the Egyptian standard for its peace deal: normalization of relations. Sadat's peace initiative was part of a comprehensive change in Egyptian policy, in which Sadat sought to prompt sweeping reforms for his country. He closed the door on the Soviet Union and made peace with Israel. It amounted to Egypt's fundamental strategic realignment.
The focus shifted away from the land-for-peace formula to a land-for-realignment calculation among many in Washington as well. By 2007, U.S. statesmen began promoting the notion that Syria and Iran were merely allies of convenience and that Syria could be flipped from the Iranian orbit. Both Hafez al-Assad during the 1990s and his son Bashar, who inherited Syria in 2000, showed no indication they were willing to part ways with Iran. And if Sadat had flown to Jerusalem to make peace with Israel, Hafez al-Assad refused to meet with any Israeli leaders throughout the decade of negotiations, even as he demanded more than 100 percent of the territory beyond the 1923 international border.
With the elder Assad at the helm, Syria remained Iran's junior partner, continued to occupy Lebanon, and helped Iran run its favorite terrorist arm, Hezbollah. However, Bashar transformed Syria's relationship with Iran to that of a client state, even transferring Syrian missiles to Hezbollah during the 2006 war between Israel and the terrorist group, rather than facilitating the transfer of Iranian weapons to Lebanon as was standard in the past. The Syrian civil war that began in 2011 completed this transformation, turning Assad into an Iranian-Hezbollah and Russian puppet, as they are responsible for saving and propping up his regime.
Any form of Syrian strategic realignment under Assad is extremely unlikely-at least for the foreseeable future. Russia's Middle East stock is on the ascent, and Syria is ground zero for its wider regional designs. Iran, for its part, is embarked on a Syrian entrenchment enterprise that stretches well beyond the military realm. And Hezbollah, which began its covert involvement in the Syrian war in 2012, has created a new "Golan Terror Network" under the leadership of Ali Musa Daqduq, a longtime senior Hezbollah operative and commander trained by IRGC Quds Force commander (and Israel's archenemy) Qassem Suleimani.
Ever since the inconclusive end to the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, analysts have predicted another round was bound to happen sooner than later. Iran is now able to extend the Lebanese front against Israel to Syria. For Iranian leaders-pledged to eventually wiping Israel off the map-their expanded ring around northern Israel and the Golan provides an expanded opportunity to strike at Israel should the Jewish state act against their nuclear program. Had Israel given up the Golan Heights in previous negotiations, Iran would also be poised on the strategic high ground, putting Israel at an even greater disadvantage.
Russia sees value in the Golan Heights for quite a different reason from Iran. They are anxious to cash in on international reconstruction funds meant to rebuild Syria. The problem is that the United States won't allow funding to flow through Assad. Putin is also interested in increasing his Middle East portfolio and standing. He likely sees the possibility of hosting a peace conference with Israel and Syria as a panacea. The process itself would legitimize Assad's rule in the eyes of the international community, open up the spigots for international funding, and increase Russia's regional role. More recently, Putin indicated he would like to play host to Palestinian-Israeli peace talks.
Israel, however, already reached several agreements regarding how far Russia would keep Iranian or Iran-backed forces from Israel but has proven incapable of enforcing them. Until Iran is removed from Syria, or until a prohibitive cost is imposed on Israel, Jerusalem is likely to keep treating Syria as an extension of Iranian territory, which means one can expect Israel to continue to strike at Iranian logistical lines, weapons transfers, and at any high-ranking member of the IRGC, Quds Force, or Hezbollah who feels lucky enough to poke his head up.
Leading Republican senators will try to pass a resolution in support of the Trump administration's recognition of Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights. This effort is currently being led by Sens. Ted Cruz (R., Texas) and Tom Cotton (R., Ark.), and Rep. Mike Gallagher (R., Wis.). The president, however, has the right to proclaim the territory as Israeli on behalf of America. But as seen with President Trump's decision to undo the Obama administration's nuclear deal with Iran, what is given by one American president can be taken away by another.
The Importance of the Golan Heights - Matthew R.J. Brodsky -
Analysis: Jerusalem is likely to keep treating Syria as an extension of Iranian territory
Like the decision to move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, President Donald Trump's recent recognition of Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights came as a surprise to many, even if the matter had already gathered steam on Capitol Hill in recent years. It was one of the least publicly discussed aspects of Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu's first meeting with Trump at the White House in February 2017. So why is the Golan so important?
The Golan Heights and the area Israel came to occupy from Syria in 1967 is a rocky, elevated plateau that ranges in height from 400 to 1,700 feet. Mount Hermon in the north marks the high point, standing at 9,232 feet tall, and it contains an Israel Defense Forces strategic observation post. The Golan also overlooks the Sea of Galilee and the Hula Valley, which is Israel's richest agricultural land. Two of the main water sources for the Jordan River-the Dan and the Banias-come from the slopes of Mt. Hermon. Damascus is only 40 miles away from the Israeli-held territory.
Israel captured the Golan Heights from Syria during the June 1967 War-the same war where Israel took the Sinai from Egypt, and the West Bank and Gaza from Jordan and Egypt respectively. The territory that came under Israeli control represented less than 1 percent of Syrian land area, yet under Syria's control it served as a forward operating position where artillery regularly shelled northern Israel, and the Palestinian Fatah organization launched regular cross-border raids. Israel annexed the territory in 1981, but the international community didn't recognize the move.
An opening for Middle East peace came in November 1977 when, in an unprecedented move, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat spoke before the Israeli Knesset and created what became known as the land-for-peace formula in negotiations with Israel. Shortly thereafter, Egypt and Israel made peace, and Israel returned the Sinai Peninsula.
In March 1991, President George H. W. Bush told Congress, "The time has come to put an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict." The United States emerged as the world's sole superpower in the aftermath of the first Gulf war and sought to capitalize on the moment. The goal was to convene a regional meeting or conference designed to comprehensively settle the Arab-Israeli dispute based on U.N. Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, which were passed in the wake of the 1967 and 1973 wars respectively.
Long considered the roadmap for Middle East peace, resolution 242 called for the "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" to "secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." It also spoke of the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force." The resolution, however, didn't provide a formula for the depth of an Arab peace offer or the amount of territory Israel would return.
The Bush administration's Madrid Conference in 1991 paved the path for separate peace tracks between Israel, Jordan, Syria, and the Palestinians, during the Clinton administration. Having given up its claim in 1988 on what became known as the West Bank (as it was on the west bank of the Jordan River), Jordan became the second Arab state to make peace with Israel in 1994.
When Israel began negotiations with Syria shortly after the Madrid Conference, the assumption was that a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights meant an Israeli withdrawal to the 1923 international border. Throughout the 1990s, however, Syria's territorial demands expanded. Syrian president Hafez al-Assad wanted a "full withdrawal," including the caveat that the pullout should be "to the June 4, 1967 line." He also added the requirement of Syrian "access to the Sea of Galilee." By 2000, Assad insisted upon "shared sovereignty over the lake."
There are several differences between the 1923 international border that Britain and France drew between their mandates and the June 4, 1967 line. The 1923 border was drawn so that all the Sea of Galilee would be within Britain's mandate, which later became Israel. On the other hand, the June 4, 1967 line was a situation, not a border. It exists on no official map. It was simply where the Israeli and Syrian forces were positioned on the eve of the 1967 war. The difference between the two amounted to 25 square miles.
The disparity in what would constitute a full Israeli withdrawal can still be seen today in how the territory is accounted for. According to Syria, the total area of the Golan Heights occupied by Israel is 580 square miles. Israel claims it is closer to 500 square miles. For its part, the CIA World Factbook puts the number far closer to Israel's view.
Whereas Syria was focused on maximizing the amount of territory it could regain in a peace agreement, Israel was focused on another key component created by the Egyptian standard for its peace deal: normalization of relations. Sadat's peace initiative was part of a comprehensive change in Egyptian policy, in which Sadat sought to prompt sweeping reforms for his country. He closed the door on the Soviet Union and made peace with Israel. It amounted to Egypt's fundamental strategic realignment.
The focus shifted away from the land-for-peace formula to a land-for-realignment calculation among many in Washington as well. By 2007, U.S. statesmen began promoting the notion that Syria and Iran were merely allies of convenience and that Syria could be flipped from the Iranian orbit. Both Hafez al-Assad during the 1990s and his son Bashar, who inherited Syria in 2000, showed no indication they were willing to part ways with Iran. And if Sadat had flown to Jerusalem to make peace with Israel, Hafez al-Assad refused to meet with any Israeli leaders throughout the decade of negotiations, even as he demanded more than 100 percent of the territory beyond the 1923 international border.
With the elder Assad at the helm, Syria remained Iran's junior partner, continued to occupy Lebanon, and helped Iran run its favorite terrorist arm, Hezbollah. However, Bashar transformed Syria's relationship with Iran to that of a client state, even transferring Syrian missiles to Hezbollah during the 2006 war between Israel and the terrorist group, rather than facilitating the transfer of Iranian weapons to Lebanon as was standard in the past. The Syrian civil war that began in 2011 completed this transformation, turning Assad into an Iranian-Hezbollah and Russian puppet, as they are responsible for saving and propping up his regime.
Any form of Syrian strategic realignment under Assad is extremely unlikely-at least for the foreseeable future. Russia's Middle East stock is on the ascent, and Syria is ground zero for its wider regional designs. Iran, for its part, is embarked on a Syrian entrenchment enterprise that stretches well beyond the military realm. And Hezbollah, which began its covert involvement in the Syrian war in 2012, has created a new "Golan Terror Network" under the leadership of Ali Musa Daqduq, a longtime senior Hezbollah operative and commander trained by IRGC Quds Force commander (and Israel's archenemy) Qassem Suleimani.
Ever since the inconclusive end to the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, analysts have predicted another round was bound to happen sooner than later. Iran is now able to extend the Lebanese front against Israel to Syria. For Iranian leaders-pledged to eventually wiping Israel off the map-their expanded ring around northern Israel and the Golan provides an expanded opportunity to strike at Israel should the Jewish state act against their nuclear program. Had Israel given up the Golan Heights in previous negotiations, Iran would also be poised on the strategic high ground, putting Israel at an even greater disadvantage.
Russia sees value in the Golan Heights for quite a different reason from Iran. They are anxious to cash in on international reconstruction funds meant to rebuild Syria. The problem is that the United States won't allow funding to flow through Assad. Putin is also interested in increasing his Middle East portfolio and standing. He likely sees the possibility of hosting a peace conference with Israel and Syria as a panacea. The process itself would legitimize Assad's rule in the eyes of the international community, open up the spigots for international funding, and increase Russia's regional role. More recently, Putin indicated he would like to play host to Palestinian-Israeli peace talks.
Israel, however, already reached several agreements regarding how far Russia would keep Iranian or Iran-backed forces from Israel but has proven incapable of enforcing them. Until Iran is removed from Syria, or until a prohibitive cost is imposed on Israel, Jerusalem is likely to keep treating Syria as an extension of Iranian territory, which means one can expect Israel to continue to strike at Iranian logistical lines, weapons transfers, and at any high-ranking member of the IRGC, Quds Force, or Hezbollah who feels lucky enough to poke his head up.
Leading Republican senators will try to pass a resolution in support of the Trump administration's recognition of Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights. This effort is currently being led by Sens. Ted Cruz (R., Texas) and Tom Cotton (R., Ark.), and Rep. Mike Gallagher (R., Wis.). The president, however, has the right to proclaim the territory as Israeli on behalf of America. But as seen with President Trump's decision to undo the Obama administration's nuclear deal with Iran, what is given by one American president can be taken away by another.
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