Russia positions itself as 'final judge' in Syria amid escalating Israeli-Iranian tensions - By Yaakov Lappin -
Moscow has also attempted to play the role of mediator between Israel and Iran, seeking to douse the shadow war raging between them on Iranian soil. Israel, for its part, is determined to disrupt Iran's plan to turn Syria into a war front against it.
The flurry of meetings between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Russian President Vladimir Putin likely reflect urgent developments in Syria that relate to Iranian activities.
The meetings come in the shadow of recent reports of a major Israeli airstrike on March 28, targeting an Iranian weapons' warehouse near the northern Syrian city of Aleppo, which reportedly resulted in large blasts and casualties.
Russia leads a pro-Assad military coalition in Syria, of which Iranian forces are a central part of. Yet it also maintains a deconfliction channel with Israel to avoid unintended clashes between its air force and the Israeli Air Force, both of which are active in the Syrian arena.
Putin has also attempted to play the role of mediator between Israel and Iran, seeking to douse the shadow war raging between them on Iranian soil. Israel, for its part, is determined to disrupt Iran's plan to turn Syria into a war front against it.
Netanyahu will fly to Moscow on Thursday for a meeting with Putin, just five days before Israel's April 9 elections. On April 1, Netanyahu and Putin held a phone conversation to talk about "military cooperation issues," according to the Kremlin, as well as "pressing bilateral issue," and "the situation in the Middle East region."
On Feb. 27, the two leaders met in Moscow to discuss Syria. Netanyahu said during that meeting, the two sides reached an agreement on how to coordinate between the militaries. They also apparently agreed on a goal of getting "foreign troops" to leave Syria, according to Netanyahu.
While Russia will not be able to satisfy everyone, it does understand that it will need to leave each side with "half of its desires," Professor Uzi Rabi, director of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University, told JNS.
To achieve this, Moscow gets every actor to spell out "what is really important to it, and here, Israel has an opportunity to define the range and perimeter of Iran's actions in Syria," he added. "In general, this is a new situation that the region is not used to. The Russians are managing this game with many bargaining chips, and Israel will have to adapt itself to the new rules of the game."
Iran's activities in Syria are tied to internal power struggles
Doron Itzchakov, a research associate at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, and at the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University, agreed that the current situation is good for Moscow.
"The Russian interest is to position itself as the 'final judge' in Syria, and this situation, in which Netanyahu runs to Putin and the Iranian side runs to him, is comfortable for them. They are comfortable with being the balancing scales," he said.
Iran, for its part, will be closely monitoring Israel's contacts with Russia and adapt its policies in Syria accordingly. "The Iranians will be watching out for Russia's policy in Syria, to see how they need to change their tactics. Iran has no plan of releasing its grip on Syria, but it changes tactics so as not to lose momentum," stated Itzchakov.
On recent example of how Iran has adapted its takeover efforts in Syria is by embedding its military personnel and weaponry into sites run by the official Syrian Arab Army. However, that didn't stop Israel from reportedly striking such targets when it detects them.
Itzchakov stressed that Iran's decisions in Syria cannot be disconnected from Tehran's wider, geo-political ambitions or from internal power struggles that are raging inside the Islamic Republic.
He cited a visit in March by Iranian President Hassan Rouhani to neighboring Iraq as an example of this linkage. The goal of that visit was to develop an economic corridor to bypass biting American sanctions, said Itzchakov.
Yet the visit also boosted the prestige of Rouhani, who is facing major criticism at home from the rival conservative bloc and the Islamic Republican Guards Corps (IRGC).
"The economic corridor Iran wants in Iraq is tied to its desire for an economic corridor to Lebanon and its ties to Syria. One cannot separate these things," said Itzchakov.
In addition, Iran has been able to build up armed forces in all of these countries-Iraq, Syria and Lebanon-and has turned them into deeply influential political forces in Iraq and Lebanon. Iran plans to do the same in Syria.
But the element responsible for this activity is mainly the IRGC and General Qasem Soleimani, commander of the overseas Iranian Quds Force unit, which is competing with Iran's Foreign Minister, Mohammad Zarif, for control of Iran's regional policies, said Itzchakov.
Out of this internal rivalry emerges the story of Iranian activities in Syria, he added. "The IRGC's power as a decision maker in geo-political, economic and diplomatic areas is rising," he said.
The internal power struggle is making "Iran more sensitive to Syria," said Itzchakov. "Even when done in opposition to the popular wishes of the Iranian people, the IRGC makes its own decisions, including in Syria. The IRGC wants to set the agenda."
The Mountains of Israel - By Daymond Duck -
First, in 2014, a powerful Islamic terrorist group called ISIS (Pres. Obama called it ISIL or the Levant) captured several cities and towns in Iraq.
The original Levant was a geographical area near the Mediterranean Sea in the Middle East that included Cyprus, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, part of Saudi Arabia, part of Turkey, part of Egypt, part of Iraq and all of Israel.
Other Islamic terrorist groups quickly joined ISIS, and the group soon started calling itself a Muslim Caliphate (a Muslim kingdom).
God promised to bless those that bless Israel and to curse those that curse Israel.
He also promised that Israel will not be defeated at the end of the age.
In mid-March 2019, the ISIS Caliphate came to an end, and Israel still stands.
God's Word is being fulfilled.
Second, the Bible says the nations around Israel will claim the mountains of Israel, slander Israel and make God angry at the end of the age (Ezek. 36:1-7).
God added that He will be on Israel's side; Israel will possess the mountains and grow crops on them.
Israel captured the Golan Heights in 1967, annexed them in 1981, and is growing crops on some of them.
On Mar. 21, 2019, the U.S. recognized the Golan Heights as sovereign Israeli territory, and God's Word is being fulfilled.
Third, a Syrian official said, "The Syrian people remain committed to the liberation of the Golan Heights by all means at its disposal."
The Word of God says Syria and Israel will get into a war at the end of the age; and Damascus, Syria, will cease to exist in one night (Isa. 17).
Syria would be wise to consider what has happened to ISIS and to read the above about the nations around Israel claiming the mountains and making God angry.
Syria won't liberate the mountains of Israel because God has already liberated them and permanently returned them to His people Israel (Ezek. 36).
Fourth, on Mar. 22, 2019, Russia, Iran and Syria condemned U.S. recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, and Turkey quickly did the same.
A large deposit of oil and natural gas has been discovered in the Golan Heights, and some think these nations will try to take it.
It is clear that these nations will be part of a group that will attack Israel from the north in the latter years and latter days to take a spoil and a prey. This will anger God, and they will perish on the mountains of Israel (Ezek. 38:12, 15, 18-23).
Fifth, on Mar. 24, 2019, it was reported that the U.S. and Israel are anticipating a breakout of violence along Israel's border with Syria and Lebanon at any moment due to U.S. recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights.
As a result, the U.S. has sent reinforcements to six U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria.
Sixth, on Mar. 21, 2019, U.S. Sec. of State Mike Pompeo was in Israel when Pres. Trump recognized the Golan Heights as sovereign Israeli territory.
It was the day before the Jewish holiday called Purim, and he was interviewed by Chris Mitchell of the Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN).
Mr. Mitchell said, "Jews worldwide and here in Jerusalem are talking about the fact that Esther 2,500 years ago saved the Jewish people with God's help from Haman" (a Persian or Iranian official that wanted to destroy the Jews).
Mr. Mitchell added, "And now, 2,500 years later, there's a new Haman here in the Middle East that wants to eradicate the Jewish people just like Haman did: the state of Iran."
Then, Mr. Mitchell asked, "Could it be that President Trump right now has been sort of raised for such a time as this, just like Queen Esther, to help save the Jewish people from the Iranian menace?"
Mr. Pompeo replied, "As a Christian, I certainly believe that's possible."
Israel will survive because God promised to protect her, and it is not too far-fetched to believe that God raised up Pres. Trump for Israel's sake.
Prophecy Plus Ministries, Inc.
Daymond & Rachel Duck
The Great March to war? - Tovah Lazaroff -
Will the Great March of Return lead to a Gaza war?
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's trip to the Gaza border to see tanks and soldiers Thursday almost seemed reassuring in a week that began with a direct rocket hit on a home in the center of the country.
The sight of that demolished house and the miraculous survival of the seven family members inside served as a reminder to the Israeli public that they were not immune from the long and deadly arm of the slow brewing conflict in Gaza.
With visions of possible death randomly raining from the skies, Netanyahu's statement of a possible extensive military campaign in the Gaza Strip almost made it seem as if the government and the IDF finally planned to take steps to end the threat from the Hamas-ruled enclave.
Right-wing Israeli politicians have claimed that only lack of political or diplomatic will has kept the IDF from rooting out Hamas in Gaza and destroying its cache of weapons and rockets.
New Right Party head and Education Minister Naftali Bennett called for the IDF "to open the gates of hell" against Hamas.
United Nations Ambassador Danny Danon warned this week during a Security Council debate, "If the terror from Gaza continues, the Hamas leadership will feel the strength of the IDF and be buried in the tunnels of Gaza."
But if Israel could easily bury Hamas, it would have done so already. In the last decade, the IDF has fought three wars against Hamas: in 2009, in 2012 and in 2014. In each conflict, it could have claimed victory, with Gaza bearing the brunt of the casualty counts and the destroyed homes.
But when the dust of war settled it was clear that far from vanquishing Hamas, its military might had only grown, from a terror organization that could barely hit Sderot 18 years ago to one that can fire deadly missiles beyond Tel Aviv.
Short of carpet bombing Gaza, or reoccupying it, another military campaign is more likely to continue the pattern of ratcheting up more demolitions and death, but is unlikely to unseat or disarm Hamas.
Netanyahu, therefore, has been slow to seek a military solution. As a result, in the last year, Hamas and Israel have been entwined in a slow dance that comes ever closer to the precipice. The country has repeatedly seemed to be on the edge of war with Gaza rockets flying like sudden sun showers that dissipate almost as quickly as they fell.
The slow, on-again, off-again drum beat of war has been helped by the Great March of Return, which began last March 30 as a six-week event and has yet to end.
Hamas was able to siphon off the frustration of the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza - made worse by Palestinian Authority sanctions -- into weekly protests against Israel.
The low-level violence, including infiltration attempts, explosive devices, burning tires, stone throwing and Molotov cocktails, was enough to warrant a response but not enough to trigger a war.
The incendiary devices launched from Gaza against Israel which burned thousands of hectares of fields and forests prompted IDF retaliatory strikes but did not warrant a full-scale conflict.
IDF response to the protesters, which has included live fire and tear gas, has led to more than 270 deaths and close to 30,000 injuries, according to the Gaza Health Ministry.
In the diplomatic arena, the Palestinian Authority was able to score points by painting the protests as peaceful, and highlighting the disproportionate nature of the violence.
The success culminated this month with the United Nations Human Rights Council creating a list of Israelis it holds to be culpable of war crimes along the Gaza border, with an eye to handing the list to the International Criminal Court in The Hague.
In the field, however, the march has not changed the deteriorating situation in Gaza for the Palestinians.
Rather, as time has gone on, the ongoing protests and riots have begun to play the role of a match in a dry field. At a time of high tension - such as now, when Hamas and Israel appear on the brink of a new conflict - violence along the border, including this weekend, could provide the spark that pushes the IDF and Hamas into a full-blown war.
Gaza Time Bomb Keeps Ticking, As Both Sides Delay The Explosion - By Yaakov Lappin -
Few events better illustrate the need for the Israel Defense Forces' policy of zero-tolerance to attempted Palestinian intrusions from Gaza than the capture earlier this month of two armed men near Kibbutz Erez, located just north of the Gaza Strip.
On March 8, IDF soldiers responding to a border intrusion alert from Gaza caught the two suspects, who were armed with grenades and knives. They were just a few minutes away were from Kibbutz Erez, where children play soccer in the fields.
The armed suspects turned out to be operatives affiliated to the Iranian-backed Palestinian Islamic Jihad terror faction, which has amassed a rocket arsenal in Gaza that is even bigger than that of Hamas. Collectively, the Gazan rocket arsenal surpasses 20,000 projectiles.
The armed intruders arrived on a Friday, when Hamas organizes weekly mass border riots. During these events, Hamas sends thousands of people towards the border with Israel. Small teams of armed terrorists then try to use the civilian rioters as human shields, approaching the border fence to attempt intrusions.
On Saturday, during "Land Day," Hamas organized some 40,000 Palestinians and sent them to the border, but this time, it made a bigger effort than usual to prevent many of them from approaching the fence. The reason for this uncharacteristic caution: Hamas is waiting to see whether Israel accepts some of its demands. This caution has not extended to rocket strikes on southern Israel, which continues into civilian areas.
For the past year, Hamas has employed weekly protests called the "March of Return" as an extortion technique to pressure Israel into allowing more funds and infrastructure projects into Gaza. Israel, for its part, wants to assist Gazan civilians, who are essentially being held hostage by their regime, but is also keen to avoid a situation in which Hamas exploits any new agreement to build up its military wing, rocket arsenal and tunnel network.
Already, the factions in Gaza are better armed than they were in 2014 and have an array of domestic weapons' production sites. Iran pays for this arms build-up and shares know-how in the manufacturing of rockets.
Yet Hamas remains deterred by the idea of an all-out war with Israel and instead seeks a way to save Gaza from implosion--to save its regime from a popular revolt and to do this without going to war. It has found the halfway tactic of "controlled escalations" to do this.
A year ago, Hamas quickly seized on the idea of "return marches." It was keen to take control of a movement that otherwise could have turned into a threat against its own rule and use it to extort Israel.
Hamas's total control of these weekly protests is unmissable and comes in the form of grenade attacks, IED border attacks and the cynical use of minors to plant bombs on the border fence.
Using children as a military tool is just one of many of Hamas's tricks. The Gazan regime also sends women to roll tires to the border fence, and then sends children to set them on fire, creating a smokescreen designed to allow Gazan youths to approach the border fence and cut it open.
Hamas has instructed rioters to rush through such openings in the border fence, so it can inject small groups of operatives armed with grenades, knives and handguns. Their mission: head to nearby Israeli villages, located just a few hundred meters from the border.
Within three minutes, these terror squads can be at the entrances of Israeli villages. Some 60,000 Israelis live in the vicinity of the Gaza Strip, where they engage in agriculture and live out their lives, as the IDF works day and night to defend their safety.
Instead of working together with Gazans on joint agricultural initiatives, southern Israelis must face rockets, mortars, tunnels, arson, and balloons and kites that carry explosive devices over the border, which the IDF rushes to neutralize before children pick them up.
Hamas has not gotten away with this "controlled" aggression without paying a price. In the past 12 months, the Israeli Air Force struck hundreds of Hamas targets in Gaza, destroying a portion of the military wing's infrastructure, rocket depots, bases, headquarters and military posts. Hamas has accumulated a large proportion of damage that will cost it dearly to rebuild.
None of these events have so far changed Hamas's basic problems: It risks losing control of Gaza, as civilians find the courage to publicly condemn its failings and have started protesting the low quality of living. Hamas makes half a billion dollars a year just from taxes it imposes on goods entering Gaza from Egypt, but most of that money goes to the military wing, not to Gaza's people. Likewise, Iran's annual assistance package goes to the military wings of Hamas and PIJ.
Hamas may be well-armed, but it remains isolated, exposed to Egyptian pressure, and it is in a state of unending conflict with its chief internal rival, Fatah.
Its rule in Gaza is also tested by the other armed factions, chief among them, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which can "employ" the Israeli Air Force to strike Hamas by launching rockets on their own initiative.
Unclear how long Hamas can rely on current tactics
The less stable situation for Hamas, the more it will seek to divert aggression outwards--in Israel's direction--and the chances for armed conflict will increase.
Hamas's answer to this paradox is to sacrifice the Gazan population and rally them under its flag by inciting them against the old familiar enemy of Israel.
It remains unclear how much longer Hamas will be able to rely on this tactic. Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas has cut the budget for Gaza by around 30 percent. Egypt is working hard to stabilize the situation, but the Egyptians are not exactly fans of the concept of a Muslim Brotherhood regime holding power on their border.
Israel is systematically destroying Hamas's cross-border tunnels, in which Hamas has invested huge resources, like cement, into building, instead of investing in housing for Gazans.
And Hamas continues to fire rockets indiscriminately into Israeli civilian areas with the intention of killing. Israel, for its part, carefully picks out every enemy target, looking to reduce collateral damage to the absolute minimum.
The central question now is how much longer this situation can continue. The two main scenarios appear to be either a broader Israeli military campaign in response to a new Hamas escalation or a long-term truce that will see Gaza receive large-scale international funds and infrastructure development programs, thereby saving the Hamas regime.
Israel sees an improvement of the humanitarian situation in Gaza as its own security interest, but only if this occurs without strengthening Hamas's military and terrorism capabilities. So far, the formula for doing that has been elusive.
In the meantime, Hamas's unending terrorism against Israelis and war of attrition on the western Negev continues. Its only achievement so far has been to put Gaza back at the top of the agenda in Israel and in the international community. The Gazan time bomb continues to tick.
As the region waits to see whether diplomacy succeeds, the IDF stands ready at the Gazan border with four brigades, a large build-up of armored vehicles and infantry, and an air force that is on high alert.
In today' Middle East, war can erupt even when neither side desires it, with the smallest incident or miscalculation snowballing into an armed conflict.
Israel, however, is far stronger than Hamas, and should a new conflict erupt, the regime will pay a very heavy price.
Gaza Time Bomb Keeps Ticking, As Both Sides Delay The Explosion - By Yaakov Lappin -
Few events better illustrate the need for the Israel Defense Forces' policy of zero-tolerance to attempted Palestinian intrusions from Gaza than the capture earlier this month of two armed men near Kibbutz Erez, located just north of the Gaza Strip.
On March 8, IDF soldiers responding to a border intrusion alert from Gaza caught the two suspects, who were armed with grenades and knives. They were just a few minutes away were from Kibbutz Erez, where children play soccer in the fields.
The armed suspects turned out to be operatives affiliated to the Iranian-backed Palestinian Islamic Jihad terror faction, which has amassed a rocket arsenal in Gaza that is even bigger than that of Hamas. Collectively, the Gazan rocket arsenal surpasses 20,000 projectiles.
The armed intruders arrived on a Friday, when Hamas organizes weekly mass border riots. During these events, Hamas sends thousands of people towards the border with Israel. Small teams of armed terrorists then try to use the civilian rioters as human shields, approaching the border fence to attempt intrusions.
On Saturday, during "Land Day," Hamas organized some 40,000 Palestinians and sent them to the border, but this time, it made a bigger effort than usual to prevent many of them from approaching the fence. The reason for this uncharacteristic caution: Hamas is waiting to see whether Israel accepts some of its demands. This caution has not extended to rocket strikes on southern Israel, which continues into civilian areas.
For the past year, Hamas has employed weekly protests called the "March of Return" as an extortion technique to pressure Israel into allowing more funds and infrastructure projects into Gaza. Israel, for its part, wants to assist Gazan civilians, who are essentially being held hostage by their regime, but is also keen to avoid a situation in which Hamas exploits any new agreement to build up its military wing, rocket arsenal and tunnel network.
Already, the factions in Gaza are better armed than they were in 2014 and have an array of domestic weapons' production sites. Iran pays for this arms build-up and shares know-how in the manufacturing of rockets.
Yet Hamas remains deterred by the idea of an all-out war with Israel and instead seeks a way to save Gaza from implosion--to save its regime from a popular revolt and to do this without going to war. It has found the halfway tactic of "controlled escalations" to do this.
A year ago, Hamas quickly seized on the idea of "return marches." It was keen to take control of a movement that otherwise could have turned into a threat against its own rule and use it to extort Israel.
Hamas's total control of these weekly protests is unmissable and comes in the form of grenade attacks, IED border attacks and the cynical use of minors to plant bombs on the border fence.
Using children as a military tool is just one of many of Hamas's tricks. The Gazan regime also sends women to roll tires to the border fence, and then sends children to set them on fire, creating a smokescreen designed to allow Gazan youths to approach the border fence and cut it open.
Hamas has instructed rioters to rush through such openings in the border fence, so it can inject small groups of operatives armed with grenades, knives and handguns. Their mission: head to nearby Israeli villages, located just a few hundred meters from the border.
Within three minutes, these terror squads can be at the entrances of Israeli villages. Some 60,000 Israelis live in the vicinity of the Gaza Strip, where they engage in agriculture and live out their lives, as the IDF works day and night to defend their safety.
Instead of working together with Gazans on joint agricultural initiatives, southern Israelis must face rockets, mortars, tunnels, arson, and balloons and kites that carry explosive devices over the border, which the IDF rushes to neutralize before children pick them up.
Hamas has not gotten away with this "controlled" aggression without paying a price. In the past 12 months, the Israeli Air Force struck hundreds of Hamas targets in Gaza, destroying a portion of the military wing's infrastructure, rocket depots, bases, headquarters and military posts. Hamas has accumulated a large proportion of damage that will cost it dearly to rebuild.
None of these events have so far changed Hamas's basic problems: It risks losing control of Gaza, as civilians find the courage to publicly condemn its failings and have started protesting the low quality of living. Hamas makes half a billion dollars a year just from taxes it imposes on goods entering Gaza from Egypt, but most of that money goes to the military wing, not to Gaza's people. Likewise, Iran's annual assistance package goes to the military wings of Hamas and PIJ.
Hamas may be well-armed, but it remains isolated, exposed to Egyptian pressure, and it is in a state of unending conflict with its chief internal rival, Fatah.
Its rule in Gaza is also tested by the other armed factions, chief among them, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which can "employ" the Israeli Air Force to strike Hamas by launching rockets on their own initiative.
Unclear how long Hamas can rely on current tactics
The less stable situation for Hamas, the more it will seek to divert aggression outwards--in Israel's direction--and the chances for armed conflict will increase.
Hamas's answer to this paradox is to sacrifice the Gazan population and rally them under its flag by inciting them against the old familiar enemy of Israel.
It remains unclear how much longer Hamas will be able to rely on this tactic. Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas has cut the budget for Gaza by around 30 percent. Egypt is working hard to stabilize the situation, but the Egyptians are not exactly fans of the concept of a Muslim Brotherhood regime holding power on their border.
Israel is systematically destroying Hamas's cross-border tunnels, in which Hamas has invested huge resources, like cement, into building, instead of investing in housing for Gazans.
And Hamas continues to fire rockets indiscriminately into Israeli civilian areas with the intention of killing. Israel, for its part, carefully picks out every enemy target, looking to reduce collateral damage to the absolute minimum.
The central question now is how much longer this situation can continue. The two main scenarios appear to be either a broader Israeli military campaign in response to a new Hamas escalation or a long-term truce that will see Gaza receive large-scale international funds and infrastructure development programs, thereby saving the Hamas regime.
Israel sees an improvement of the humanitarian situation in Gaza as its own security interest, but only if this occurs without strengthening Hamas's military and terrorism capabilities. So far, the formula for doing that has been elusive.
In the meantime, Hamas's unending terrorism against Israelis and war of attrition on the western Negev continues. Its only achievement so far has been to put Gaza back at the top of the agenda in Israel and in the international community. The Gazan time bomb continues to tick.
As the region waits to see whether diplomacy succeeds, the IDF stands ready at the Gazan border with four brigades, a large build-up of armored vehicles and infantry, and an air force that is on high alert.
In today' Middle East, war can erupt even when neither side desires it, with the smallest incident or miscalculation snowballing into an armed conflict.
Israel, however, is far stronger than Hamas, and should a new conflict erupt, the regime will pay a very heavy price.
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