WORLD AT WAR: 8.1.20 - Iran's Sprint to the Bomb

Iran's Sprint to the Bomb - by Peter Huessy - https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/16262/iran-buclear-bomb-sprint In 2013, Danny Danon, Israel's Deputy Defense Minister, warned that Iran was speedily moving to develop advanced centrifuges that will enable it to enrich uranium needed for nuclear weaponswithin one month. "We have made it crystal clear ," Danon said, "Israel will not stand by and watch Iran develop weaponry that will put us, the entire Middle East and eventually the world, under an Iranian umbrella of terror." This concern was shared by the United States and thus, in 2015, a nuclear agreement -- the Joint Comprehensive Program of Action (JCPOA) -- was made between the United States, along with Russia,China, France, Great Britain and Germany, and supposedly Iran, which never signed the deal. Ostensibly Iran would give up its pursuit of nuclear weapons and the U.S. would withdraw its economic sanctions. Iran, of course, had no intention of giving up its pursuit of nuclear weapons; contrary to what JCPOA supporters claimed, the Iranians, even under the JCPOA deal, could continue pursuing theirquest for nuclear capability. This "loophole" was clear especially after it was revealed the Obama administration had conceded that Iran had a right to enrich uranium, which is not required for "peaceful" nuclear energy. It cannot therefore be a surprise that Iran is still sprinting toward deliverable nuclear weapons with the very uranium enrichment technology permitted by the 2015 agreement. While the U.S.Senate was told the deal would halt Iran's pursuit of nuclear weaponry, the deal only camouflaged the mullahs' ambitions to acquire it. Worse, when the deal's provisions were to sunset this decade, Iran would have been free to acquire full nuclear capability without pretending it was not. At the time of the 2015 deal, the Obama administration warned that Iran was probably a year way from having enough nuclear material to fashion a bomb. Now, it is reported by David Albrightof the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) that until recently, Iran was no more than one or two months away from a nuclear weapons capability. Some people take solace in the partial destruction of the building at Natanz that housed many of Iran's centrifuges, in which a mysterious explosion occurred in early July. Although ISIS saysthe damage is serious, other sources say the hall underneath the building, where the centrifuges are located, was not destroyed. The Natanz facility, which was finished in 2018, was to mass-produce thousands of advanced centrifuges for nuclear weapons fuel production. It took six years for the building to be completed;it is important to remember that Iran was building its major nuclear weapons capability all during the negotiations that led up to the JCPOA deal and for three years afterward. As the United States, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Israel have argued all this time, Iran's Islamic rulers never gave up their pursuit of nuclear weapons. Obviously, somebody took thesearguments seriously: Natanz, a key facility in the Iranian nuclear program, was likely bombed. Some experts say to rebuild the facility will take upwards of two years, while others say the nuclear program is only delayed by a few months. The latter opinionis supported by the fact that Iran maintains numerous complexes for nuclear weapons work and, as noted, the centrifuge hall under Natanz is said to remain intact. Throughout all this, critics still maintain that the United States policy of "maximum pressure" is what drives the Iranians to accelerate their quest for nuclear weapons. Their solution? The U.S. should rejoin the JCPOA! Such arguments fall apart for a number of reasons. First, the Iranians have never given up their pursuit of nuclear weapons: they never complied with the JCPOA from its start. Second, as USAFGeneral and former CIA Director Michael Hayden explained, the JCPOA actually allowed Iran to build an "industrial strength nuclear program" with a capability that served no other purpose than to allow Iran to build a nuclear weapon in a matter of months. Andthird, the "maximum pressure" campaign seems to be working, and working so well that it drove the Iranians to make a fateful decision: sprint to a nuclear weapon and risk being found out -- or suffer further economic deterioration that would eventually bankruptIran and threaten the survivability of the regime. The mullahs obviously chose to continue their sprint to a bomb. They enriched more uranium, refused IAEA inspections for military sites where nuclear work was done, illegally sought nucleartechnology from Germany, and expanded their violations of the JCPOA, all the while trying to keep the U.S. military at bay and enticing the Europeans to increase investment and trade. The strategy might have worked: the White House is reluctant to go to war in an election year, even if the U.S. could destroy the entire Iranian nuclear weapons program. After America triedregime change in Iraq to eliminate Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction, "not again" became the Pentagon watchword. With U.S. military leaders remaining wary of an escalation of rising tensions between Iran and the United States, the mullahs are countingon U.S. restraint to shield them from attack. U.S. restraint is one thing, but what about the friends of the United States? In 1981, for instance, the Israelis destroyed the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq with a perilous long-range airattack without air-to-air refueling. Then, in September 2007, the Israelis destroyed a nuclear reactor in Syria that was being built by North Korea and paid for with Iranian cash. In short, the U.S. may not need to end Iran's nuclear weapons program by "going to war," the argument used by JCPOA supporters who said that the U.S. had a choice either to agree to a flawednuclear deal (even one allowing Iran eventually to get nuclear weapons) or go to war. A better choice is to recognize that the United States has allies that could get the job done, such as an Israeli government that understands how to deal with difficult militaryproblems, and a Saudi Arabia willing to help with matters such as over-flight permission and airfield use to refuel returning airplanes. The Iranian leadership knows this. They understand they are facing an alliance of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United States and Israel, all of which see the JCPOA as a dangerous failure.The mullahs also know that all the Middle East allies need to "get the job done" is an American green light. As a result of that understanding, current events, and sanctions, Iran is seeking to be rescued by China. Although first explored in 2016, and to a degree previewed last year, the Iraniangovernment has now formalized a new historic deal with China. In exchange for hundreds of billions of dollars in promised investment, Iran is promising cheap oil for 25 years and access to the Persian Gulf for military facilities and bases. As one analyst put it, Iran is "selling its soul to China," apparently giving up on Europe to provide enough investment to prop up its economy. China is buying time for Iran. Perhaps Chinabelieves that its presence in the region will persuade the United States to show "restraint." The United States should not take the bait. It is clear that Iran is "crossing important [nuclear] thresholds that dangerously reduce its breakout time" to anywhere from two to four months,according to John Hannah of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Combined with IAEA concerns over the equipment and nuclear material at two sites targeted for inspection but denied access by Iran, it is obvious the nuclear weapons threat from Iran is onlygetting worse. In addition, in April, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), launched a military satellite into orbit. It was no doubt a prelude to a nuclear-armed missile being launched. The prospects ahead are possibly dark. A change in U.S. administration may likely see a return to the JCPOA, an end to sanctions and maximum pressure, and an Iranian sense of having won amajor struggle with the "Great Satan." That is not a prospect American allies in the Middle East want to accept. The United States should not risk waiting, either. The world knows that the JCPOA never ended -- or even intended to end -- Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons. The ticking clocks you hear denote a race between America and its allies pursuingthe destruction of Iran's nuclear weapons program on the one hand, and Iran's sprint to the bomb and an umbrella of terror on the other. Israel & Hezbollah Prepare For Next Round Of Conflict - By Yoav Limor/JNS.org - https://www.prophecynewswatch.com/article.cfm?recent_news_id=4188 Israel and Hezbollah are again embroiled in a perilous dynamic of escalation. How things unfold, as always, depends on the degree of self-restraint and level-headednesson both sides, and just as importantly on luck. Hezbollah plans to perpetrate a terrorist attack in the coming days. Hence the Israel Defense Forces dispatched reinforcements to the Lebanese border last week and raisedalert levels. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah said in the past that he would retaliate from Lebanese soil for any harm to his personnel, even if they were wounded or killed in Syria.Such was the case last September, following the assassination of a Hezbollah drone cell in the Syrian Golan Heights; and such is the case now as he seeks to avenge the death of a Hezbollah operative in an airstrike on Damascus International Airport last Monday,which has been attributed to Israel. We can assume that, if Israel was indeed behind the attack, Israeli officials didn't know the Hezbollah operative was present at the targeted site. Efforts are usually madeto avoid casualties, which increase the likelihood of a counter-response. But from the moment the (relatively junior) operative was killed, the situation took on a life of its own: social-media sites in Lebanon erupted, with users mocking Nasrallahfor failing to back up his words. It seems he initially couldn't decide whether or not to retaliate, but the IDF's recent measures indicate the decision has already been made in Beirut. Nasrallah does not want a war. He is in unprecedented distress. Lebanon is in tatters economically, on the verge of insolvency. Unemployment numbers are through the roof.Because it is a part of the government, Hezbollah is perceived as being part of the problem. The terrorist group has not avoided the vitriol of the masses, not least because many of the problems stem from the economic sanctions imposed against it, which heavilyburden Lebanon's financial systems. This distress is also palpable among Hezbollah's rank and file. Iranian funding has dried up considerably because of the Islamic Republic's own economic hardships in theface of crippling U.S. sanctions. Nasrallah has to maneuver to survive. A war that will wreak havoc on Lebanon, and mainly on the country's Shi'ite population, will give him nothing. He plunged Lebanon into a war with Israel in 2006, for whichhe eventually expressed his regret. "Nasrallah is a Shi'ite, but he isn't suicidal," a senior IDF officer said this week. Responding, but on a small scale We can expect Nasrallah to try walking a tightrope. He'll look to retaliate, but to the most minimal degree possible. If he could kill one IDF soldier, an eye for an eye,so to speak, he would take it and close this chapter. He'll likely look to hit an easy target from inside Lebanon, with an anti-tank missile, sniper or roadside bomb. The IDF, as stated, is preparing accordingly, and since Friday night forces have reduced their visibility. IDF vehicles are banned from using roads in the northern sector,which is exposed to Lebanese territory. Civilians can go about their daily routines, on the assumption that Hezbollah wants to kill a soldier, but military units are under stringent restrictions so as not to give Hezbollah a convenient target. Past experience tells us however that a target will eventually be found. Inevitably, the enemy will make contact. Such was the case last year when an army ambulance violatedsecurity protocol near Avivim and was attacked with anti-tank missiles. Miraculously, all five soldiers inside the vehicle survived. Although the IDF at the time presented the incident as a success, mostly because it was part of a deceptionexercise, it could have ended in abject failure. It was only by dint of fortune that a more serious incident was avoided, which would have assuredly triggered a grave, unpredictable escalation. This is precisely the current situation. If Hezbollah harms soldiers, Israel will have to respond. To that end, reinforcements were sent north and additional outfits (mainlyin the air force) were placed on a heightened alert footing. Hezbollah will then have to exact a price after Israel retaliates, and so forth. The downward spiral, at that point, will depend, as stated, on the leaders and luck. Although neither side wants awar, they can afford not to respond even less. Bracing for an Iranian response Supposedly, Hezbollah could have mitigated this risk by responding from the Golan Heights sector. The IDF is preparing for this, too: The Israeli helicopter attack on Friday--inresponse to errant Syrian anti-aircraft fire that landed in Israeli territory--was exploited to destroy observation posts on the Syrian side of the border. There's another reason for the heightened readiness along the Syrian frontier--Iran. In Tehran, regime officials are determined to retaliate for the significant damage atthe centrifuge production facility at Natanz, which has been attributed to Israel. The belief is that this response will come from Syrian territory, and will be separate from Hezbollah's response over the death of its operative in Damascus. This state of affairs means IDF forces will remain on high alert, at least over the coming days. Last September, it took Hezbollah a week to respond. This time around, itmight want things to happen sooner, perhaps before the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Adha on July 31. What happens next will depend on the outcome of the Hezbollah attack. If it is deadly, heaven forbid, Israel will strike back. At that point, the path to full-blown waris exceedingly short. Israel and Lebanon, both buckling under the weight of the coronavirus and their struggling economies, could find themselves caught in an unwanted tailspin. Anyone on either side searching for conspiracy theories can rest assured: These tensions and the heightened alert are quite real. This scenario appears in every briefingthe Military Intelligence Directorate has presented in recent years, certainly due to the scope of Israeli airstrikes in Syria, alleged and otherwise. We can only hope that both sides exhibit the same level of judgment that has guided their actions since the Second Lebanon War, and end this current spat before the situationdangerously spins out of control. What is Iran's strategy amid Israel-Hezbollah tensions? - Seth J. Frantzman - https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/what-is-irans-strategy-amid-israel-hezbollah-tensions-636718 Iran expert argues that a reading of some Iranian press may hint at the regime's complex policy during the tensions. Iran has been surprisingly quiet amid the growing Israel-Hezbollah tensions. Part of that is due to the fact that Iran is running a massive military drill off its coast,where it has been using new missiles and showing the US it can harass a model aircraft carrier. However, Iran's real position may be more complex, because it knows the high stakes of escalation and different advisers within the government, though the ayatollah's officeand Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps may prefer quiet over massive conflict. Yossi Mansharof of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, an expert on Iran, argues that a reading of some Iranian press may hint at the regime's complex policyduring the tensions. Kayhan newspaper, which is conservative and close to Ayatollah Khamenei's office, initially reported on July 27 that Hezbollah anti-tank fire had destroyed an Israeli tank,killing five IDF soldiers and injuring 13 others, Mansharof points out. Why does this matter? Because Iranian media, close to the leadership, was seeking to claim that Israelis were killed and wounded. "This is a newspaper close to the ayatollah," says Mansharof. "This is a signal of Iran to Hezbollah to halt the escalation and not do more." He argues that Iran might be seeking to showcase Hezbollah's abilities and therefore prevent a larger escalation. Hezbollah had vowed to retaliate after claiming one ofits fighters was killed on July 20. This meant Hezbollah must do something to show it "retaliated." But if Iran could say that Hezbollah already "succeeded" then there would be no need for more escalation. Hezbollah has done the opposite, arguing that the incident on July27 in which Israel said it thwarted an attack, had never happened and that therefore Hezbollah still reserves a right to attack. Hezbollah now seems to be celebrating humiliating Israel by keeping Israel in a state of alert. What does Iran want in all this? Mansharof says that they may want to preserve the ongoing precision-guided missile project, in which the IRGC Quds Force seeks to significantlyimprove the missile threat of Hezbollah against Israel. "Kayhan seeks to present Israel as a weak country and suggests it is not a powerful player in the region," he says. The long-term goal for Iran is to preserve Hezbollah as a major threat to Israel and to be able to use it to retaliate when Iran wants, perhaps for other incidents thatIran claims to want revenge for. That means Iran may prefer other types of strikes at Israel or Israel's interests for the moment, but not a conflict with Hezbollah. Iran must also contend with other issues. It wants to remove the US from Iraq and to challenge US forces in the region through similar threats that Hezbollah poses to Israel.This puts Tehran in a complex place at the moment. If Iranian media is an indication, it is not playing up the Israel-Hezbollah tensions. It might wish they would go away for now, to be raised at a later date.