ISIS UPDATE: 7.15.16 - APOCCALYPSE SOON?

Apocalypse Soon? The Battle for Dabiq - by Thomas R. McCabe - http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/apocalypse-soon-the-battle-for-dabiq

 

The extremely confused land war against ISIS in Syria and Iraq continues to grind on, with the current situation trending somewhat against ISIS in Iraq, less so in Syria.

 

The Russian intervention has bought the Assad regime at least an improved stalemate, with the Assad regime consolidating their position in their western Syrian bastion (although their hold on that may still be uncertain) and regaining some ground, especially around Palmyra in the south. (However, their attempt to expand toward ISIS's Syrian 'capital' of Raqqa has evidently failed.) While Assad has gone through the motions of negotiating there is no reason to believe he has abandoned his past announced intention to militarily crush the rebellions. (This is, after all, the preferred method in the region, since the aim is not just to defeat current rebellions but to intimidate the survivors-the claim that you can't kill your way out of an insurgency being Western thinking.) Continuing Russian-supported offensives by Assad-aligned forces, including nonSyrian Shia jihadi militias such as Lebanese Hezbollah, have--at least for the moment--isolated Aleppo. The Russians are supposedly committed to support the Assad regime's intended reconquest of the city.

 

While the Kurdish YPG and its screen of allies in the Syrian Democratic Forces, who have continued to make ground advances against ISIS, occasionally talk about advancing south to Raqqa,  they recognize doing so would probably be extremely difficult and costly, and it is more likely their major concern is consolidating a Kurdish-controlled region along the Turkish border with Syria. In Iraq, the partially rebuilt Iraqi Security Forces and their allies, having retaken Fallujah, are in what is probably at most the preliminary phases of preparing the ground for an offensive to retake Mosul. While the Iraqi Kurds have announced they are ready to take Mosul, they are waiting for Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) support for what they expect to be a very bloody battle. Meanwhile, the Iraqi Government is struggling to avoid collapse due to political infighting.

 

In all likelihood, the Battle for (or, more likely, the prolonged siege of) Aleppo will be the major battle in the Syrian Civil War for the foreseeable future. However, the Battle of Aleppo is not likely to be a decisive battle in the war against ISIS. Most of the opposition forces there are either from Jabhat an Nusra (Al Qaeda's Syrian branch) or other non-ISIS factions. There is no reason to believe ISIS will commit major forces to the battle-they will undoubtedly prefer to let their enemies fight while preserving their own strength.

 

Aside from Aleppo, the most potentially strategically significant area for the foreseeable future is the enclave, sometimes called the "Manbij Pocket," along the Turkish border between the Kurdish enclave of Afrin to the west and the Kurdish-controlled region east of the Euphrates. As of mid-2016, most of the area is held by ISIS, although the SDF and the Kurds have a foothold across the October Dam in the southeast, and have been trying to take the town of Manbij proper, while anti-ISIS rebels control an area in the north and west. The strategic importance of the area to the various combatants is clear:

* ISIS and undoubtedly the other jihadi factions want to retain it to maintain access to what has evidently so far been a comparatively open operating environment in Turkey. ISIS is also firing rockets into Turkey from the pocket.

* The Kurds want it to establish a continuous belt of Kurdish-controlled territory along the Turkish-Syrian border and to consolidate a Kurdish region within Syria.

* The other rebel factions operating there, especially those supported by the Turks, want to maintain control to allow continued access to Turkey.

* The Assad Regime will want to take control to, at the very least, seal the border with Turkey and reclaim the territory.

* The Turks want to be able to support their favored anti-Assad factions, preserve it as a buffer to keep more refugees out of Turkey, block hostile factions from firing into Turkey, and prevent the Kurds from consolidating control of the border area.

 

But if these weren't enough, another reason why a major-and potentially a decisive--battle with ISIS may be fought in the enclave is because it contains the village of Dabiq.  The importance of Dabiq is not because of its tactical or strategic military significance-it has none-but because of the religious significance ISIS has chosen to give the place.

 

The Religious Significance of Dabiq

 

Like Christianity, Islam is a diverse faith, with various interpretations. The one chosen by ISIS has declared that Dabiq is to be the location of the decisive battle-"al-Malhamah al-Kubra"--between the forces of Islam and those ISIS defines as Crusaders, which will supposedly herald "the Hour"-- the end times of the world. As ISIS has said in Dabiq, their on-line propaganda publication named after the town; [Note-author explanations in brackets]

 

"As mentioned in the introduction to our first issue, the name of our magazine was taken from the area named Dābiq in the northern countryside of Halab [Aleppo], due to the significant role it will play during the events of al-Malhamah al-Kubrā (The Grand Battle) against the crusaders.

 

"Abu Hurayrah [a companion of the Prophet Muhammad] reported that Allah's Messenger [the Prophet Muhammad] (sallallāhu 'alayhi wa sallam) said, "The Hour will not be established until the Romans land at al-A'māq or Dābiq (two places near each other in the northern countryside of Halab). Then an army from Madīnah [Medina] of the best people on the earth at that time will leave for them. When they line up in ranks the Romans will say, 'Leave us and those who were taken as prisoners from amongst us so we can fight them.' The Muslims will say, 'Nay, by Allah, we will not abandon our brothers to you.' So they will fight them. Then one third of them will flee; Allah will never forgive them. One third of them will be killed; they will be the best martyrs with Allah. And one third will conquer them; they will never be afflicted with fitnah [intra-Muslim infighting]. Then they will conquer Constantinople.

 

These battles are supposed to be followed by even more momentous events. The ISIS-favored prediction continues;

 

"While they are dividing the war booty, having hung their swords on olive trees, Shaytān [Satan, the enemy of God] will shout, 'The [false] Messiah has followed after your families [who were left behind.]' So they will leave [for their families], but Shaytān's claim is false. When they arrive to Shām [Syria] he comes out. Then when they are preparing for battle and filing their ranks, the prayer is called. So 'Īsā Ibn Maryam [Jesus, son of Mary] (sallallāhu 'alayhi wa sallam) will descend and lead them. When the enemy of Allah sees him, he will melt as salt melts in water. If he were to leave him he would melt until he perished, but he kills him with his own hand, and then shows them his blood upon his spear."

 

This religious claim is reinforced by a prediction from ISIS's founding godfather, Abu Mus'ab az-Zarqāwī, whose quote about Dabiq is on the opening pages of every issue of the publication:

 

"The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify - by Allah's permission- until it burns the crusader armies in Dābiq."

 

We should note that while there are various interpretations as to the signs of the Hour and whether it is imminent, polling indicates that expectations that the world is approaching the End Times are evidently widespread among Muslims. However, although at least one of the previous ISIS leaders thought the Hour was imminent and ran the organization accordingly, it is at least open to question whether the current ISIS leadership actually believes these prophesies--they may well not. In Dabiq they rather carefully hedge on the issue. The Zarqawi quote doesn't pin them down by saying that it is necessarily imminent-it requires Allah's permission.  One article in their publication Dabiq on "The Islamic State Founders on Signs of the Hour" actually had nothing on such signs.  However, by emphasizing Dabiq they have declared the place to be what might be considered a religiously-defined strategic center of gravity for their movement. 

 

Therefore, Dabiq may ultimately be significant for one of the major reasons that Stalingrad became significant-the enemy leader decided to make it significant.  That being the case, we should expect ISIS to fight hard to hold it, and anyone trying to capture it should expect a major battle.  Because religious factors are central to the motivation of many ISIS fighters, ISIS attempts to mobilize its fighters to fight there should have more success than in several past efforts. It is also likely to encourage their willingness to sacrifice themselves ("martyrdom" in ISIS thinking) in the fighting.

 

ISIS is the most powerful of the rebel factions in Syria. Since a major Kurdish move into the area risks open Turkish intervention, and the non-ISIS rebel factions are too weak and/or too fragmented to make a joint effort (and many of them may be further weakened in the coming battle for Aleppo), the most likely antagonist will be the Assad Regime, or more correctly its allies, in particular Lebanese Hezbollah and the other Shia jihadis recruited by Iran, supported by Iranian units and Russian air, artillery, and special operations forces. (The Syrian Arab Army is evidently largely defunct.) Meanwhile, ISIS-related facilities, concentrations, and troop movements in the area are an obvious potential target for Coalition air strikes and any artillery or rockets the U.S. deploys in the region.

 

If ISIS loses Dabiq, they won't be able to ignore the loss, as they did with the battle of Kobane,  or double-talk about it not being significant. The motto of ISIS is "Remaining and Expanding." It is difficult for them to claim they have been expanding lately, and if they lose Dabiq they will be unable to claim they are remaining either. And since they claim to be on a divine mission, how can they claim Allah's favor if the infidels win a battle that ISIS has declared to be decisive?

 

Israel Hits ISIS in Sinai as Ties with Egypt Intensify - By P. David Hornik - https://pjmedia.com/homeland-security/2016/07/12/israel-hits-isis-in-sinai-as-ties-with-egypt-intensify/

 

"A former senior Israeli official," Bloomberg reports, "said his country has conducted numerous drone attacks on militants in Sinai in recent years with Egypt's blessing. He spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss confidential military activity."

 

"Militants in Sinai" refers primarily to ISIS, which has a branch there called Sinai Province. The Sinai Peninsula is a part of Egypt that Israel, after wresting it from Egypt in the 1967 Six Day War, handed back as part of the 1981 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty.

 

In light of the fact that, since Egyptian president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi took power in 2013, Israel and Egypt have maintained tight security cooperation, such Israeli drone strikes come as no surprise. ISIS in Sinai has mounted dozens of attacks on Egyptian security personnel there, and threatens Israel as well.

 

Sisi, who in 2013 overthrew Egypt's short-lived Muslim Brotherhood government, has also moved aggressively against a Brotherhood offshoot, Hamas, in Gaza-again with Israeli cooperation.

 

But with a visit to Israel this week by Egyptian foreign minister Sameh Shoukry, the Israeli-Egyptian relationship appears to have taken an important step beyond the security sphere. It was the first visit to Israel by an Egyptian foreign minister in nine years. By all accounts, Shoukry's talks with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu were held in a good atmosphere and went well.

 

Aside from discussing and further enhancing the security cooperation-which Israel's deputy chief of staff told Bloomberg is at a "level...we've never experienced before"-what's in it for the two sides?

 

For Netanyahu, it has to do with fending off initiatives, or possible initiatives, to tackle the Palestinian issue without Israel's consent and with a likely pro-Palestinian bias.

 

One of those initiatives comes from France, which in June held an international conference on the Palestinian issue that Israel strongly opposed, and which neither Israeli nor Palestinian representatives attended.

 

Considering France's longstanding pro-Palestinian bias, and President Fran�ois Hollande's Socialist government's electoral dependence on France's Muslim population, Israel sees France's involvement as unwelcome and likely to lead to pro-Palestinian resolutions, potentially in the UN Security Council, and pressure on Israel.

 

And the other possible push to solve the Palestinian problem could, it is believed, come from President Barack Obama, especially in the last two months of his tenure.

 

Obama, too, is seen in Israel as partial to the Palestinians and also as having scores to settle with Netanyahu, particularly over his speech to Congress denouncing Obama's nuclear deal with Iran.

 

Israeli media are now rife with rumors of a possible upcoming meeting on the Palestinian issue between Netanyahu and Sisi in Egypt, or one between Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas that would be hosted by Sisi in Egypt.

 

Netanyahu has long talked of a "regional peace initiative" involving Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and Sunni Arab states that have tacit ties with Israel. With Egypt one of those states now putting the ties out in the open, hopes of such a scenario-one that would upend possible moves by Paris or Washington-have grown.

 

As for Egypt, along with Israel's security assistance and the potential prestige of assuming the role of regional peace facilitator, its eyes are on Israel's natural gas fields in the Mediterranean and the lifeline they represent.

 

Although Egypt has discovered a natural gas field of its own, the largest in the Mediterranean, it needs time to develop it and meanwhile is suffering a severe energy crunch. Israel, for now, can supply what Egypt needs, and the two countries are negotiating a multibillion-dollar energy contract.

 

With Israel recently having signed a reconciliation agreement with Turkey, with Saudi Arabia reportedly having helped arrange the Egyptian foreign minister's visit, and with Israeli-Egyptian ties blooming, the larger picture that emerges is one where Israel's power in both the security and economic spheres is growing too great for regional countries to forgo the benefits.

 

Having common foes like Iran and ISIS has something to do with it; so does the Obama administration's empowerment of Iran and relative disinterest in traditional American allies. It doesn't necessarily mean Israeli-Palestinian peace is about to emerge, or that Arab states and their populations are about to warmly accept Israel. Caution is in order.

 

Still, the region is changing before our eyes in ways that would have been unimaginable just a few years ago, and that warrant -cautious-Israeli optimism.