Iran has stopped dismantling nuclear centrifuges - https://ca.news.yahoo.com/iran-stopped-dismantling-nuclear-centrifuges-senior-official-152200733.html
Iran has stopped dismantling centrifuges in two uranium enrichment plants, state media reported on Tuesday, days after conservative lawmakers complained to President Hassan Rouhani that the process was too rushed.
Last week, Iran announced it had begun shutting down inactive centrifuges at the Natanz and Fordow plants under the terms of a deal struck with world powers in July that limits its nuclear program in exchange for easing sanctions.
Iran's hardliners continue to resist and undermine the nuclear deal, which was forged by moderates they oppose and which they see as a capitulation to the West.
"The (dismantling) process stopped with a warning," Ali Shamkhani, Secretary of the National Security Council, was quoted as saying by the ISNA student news agency.
Only decommissioned centrifuges were being dismantled to begin with, of which there were about 10,000 at Natanz and Fordow, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran has said.
Shamkhani did not specify what he meant by "warning", but the head of parliament's nuclear deal commission, Alireza Zakani, told Mehr news agency that the dismantling had stopped in Fordow because of the lawmakers' letter to Rouhani.
Zakani, who was not one of the signatories of the letter, did not mention activities at Natanz.
A group of 20 hardline parliamentarians wrote to the president last week complaining that the deactivation of centrifuges contradicted the directives of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Khamenei has said that the deal should only be implemented once allegations of past military dimensions (PMD) of Iran's nuclear program had been settled.
The International Atomic Energy Agency is expected to announce its conclusions on PMD by Dec. 15.
Centrifuges spin at supersonic speed to increase the ratio of the fissile isotope in uranium. Low-enriched uranium is used to fuel nuclear power plants, Iran's stated goal, but can also provide material for bombs if refined much further.
Iran denied Western suspicions it was aiming to build a nuclear bomb.
Iran's Russian missiles 'intensify arms race' - Justin Bronk - http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/11/analysis-iran-russian-missiles-intensify-arms-race-151109184521840.html
Range and advance tracking of S-300 system allows Iran to threaten aircraft long way from its borders.
Saudi Arabia's costly war against Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen continues to provide a serious and ongoing source of tension across the Gulf. Meanwhile, the Russian intervention in Syria on the side of President Bashar al-Assad supports Iranian policy in Syria and directly threatens the aims of the Gulf state monarchies.
The announcement made this Monday that a long-discussed and highly controversial deal between Russia and Iran for the supply of advanced S-300 missile and air defence systems has finally been signed, will further enrage the Saudi government in particular and inflame regional tensions.
The latest version available for export, the S-300VM, which NATO calls SA-23, is a long-range and highly capable surface-to-air missile (SAM) system which can shoot down both high-performance military aircraft as well as ballistic and cruise missiles.
Its range of 200km against high-flying aircraft targets will give Iran a weapons system capable of threatening air traffic and military jets far beyond its own borders.
Long coverage
Under most combat conditions the S-300 is very dangerous for modern combat aircraft that do not have very low observable (VLO) or stealth technology.
Russia claims that some versions of the system even have limited capabilities against stealth aircraft. However, no S-300s are known to have been fired in combat, let alone against stealth aircraft, so these claims are dubious.
A later modification of the basic S-300 line yielded Russia's S-400 which was designed especially to improve capabilities against stealth fighters, suggesting previous versions could not reliably track or destroy these.
S-300VM systems based in forward positions held by Iran, such as islands in the Gulf, could project threat coverage as far as Kuwait City and the Ali Al-Salem and Ahmad Al-Jaber airbases, Al-Minhad and Al-Dhafra, as well as the oil fields of Zakum and Shariqah and Qatar's north dome gas field.
Furthermore, air corridors used by international carriers through the Gulf could be shut by a threat from Iran should the country choose to do so during a crisis, although the international ramifications would be severe.
Operations against targets in Iran covered by S-300 systems, Gulf state or Western air forces would require extensive electronic-warfare support in terms of tracking, jamming, and suppression capabilities. Outside the United States Air Force and US Navy, such capabilities are in critically short supply.
More power required
To stand a chance of suppressing S-300 systems without serious losses, would probably require US Navy EA-18G Growlers for brute-force jamming; RC-135U Combat Sent and RC-135V/W Rivet Joint aircraft for long-range signaling of intelligence and radar location; and F-22 Raptor and B-2 Spirit stealth aircraft for direct attacks.
In addition, AWACS and Joint-STARS battle management and coordination assets would be required to coordinate such a complex strike package.
The US Air Force also possesses the essential institutional experience required for suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) operations, and multiple stealth assets which would be able to either bypass S-300 batteries altogether, or at least get close enough to them - without being tracked - to destroy or suppress them, and relay targeting information for standoff attacks by other aircraft.
This mix of capabilities would be a serious stretch for the US Air Force to deploy at short notice and impossible for any smaller air forces without US support.
However, even for the US, an operation like this would take months to organise and mount. The likely 'first response' from US Navy carrier battlegroups in the Gulf would be potentially vulnerable to an S-300 threat as the F-18 and EA-18 Growler are not stealth, although the Growler is a potent jammer platform.
Shift in dynamics
While S-300 systems cannot attack ground targets and so are predominantly defensive in nature, the Middle East's fragile politics and the fact that Iran acquiring these systems will cause a significant change in military power dynamics, make them a potent source for future instability.
The US, UK and their Gulf allies would need to carefully weigh the risks of removing the threat entirely, or else learn to live with a strengthened Iranian hand across the Gulf.
US responses if and when deliveries commence might include increasing deployments of the US Air Force's scarce F-22 Raptor stealth fighters to the region, and potentially to conduct 'training sorties' for B-2 Spirit stealth nuclear and conventional bombers near Iranian airspace as a show of force.
On the other hand, using stealth aircraft in proximity to Iran's airspace on a regular basis might decline due to fears of giving Iran too much information on the S-300s ability to track these aircraft. The Gulf States are also more likely to renew their interest in Lockheed Martin's stealthy F-35 fighter to help counterbalance the S-300. This could intensify the arms race already going on in the Middle East.
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