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Friday, October 12, 2018

WORLD AT WAR: 10.13.18 - Russia Raises the Stakes in Syria with S-300 Missiles


 
Russia's sudden deployment of S-300 surface-to-air missiles in Syria last week raised the stakes in Syria significantly for the U.S. and Israel.
 
While it is easy to conclude things have become far more dangerous, the fact is that there are certain important aspects of the situation on the ground that we just don't know.
 
Before we consider what we don't know, it is important to understand what we do know about what has happened since a Syrian surface-to-air missile crew shot down a Russian IL-20 spy plane on September 17.
 
Russia deployed forces and aircraft to Syria in 2015 to prevent the defeat of the Iranian-backed regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad in the Syrian civil war. Shortly after Russian forces arrived in Syria, Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu flew to Moscow to work out a deconfliction mechanism with Russian President Vladimir Putin. That mechanism enabled the Israeli Air Force (IAF) to continue attacking Iranian military targets in Syria, as it had been doing since the outset of the war in Syria without coming into direct conflict with Russia.
 
On September 17, the IAF bombed Iranian-Hezbollah targets in Syria's Latakia region. According to Israel, the IAF informed the Russians of its plan to attack 12 minutes before the raid took place, sufficient time for all Russian air and other assets to avoid danger.
 
Ten minutes after the time that Israel claims its jets completed their mission and returned to Israeli air space, a Syrian crew manning a Russian-made S-200 surface to air missile battery shot down a Russian IL-20 spy plane. 15 Russian crew members on board were killed.
 
Rather than carry out an investigation of the Syrian action, the Russian Defense Ministry and some Kremlin spokesmen immediately blamed Israel for the attack.
 
Israel insists the attack was the result of indiscriminate missile fire by the Syrian crew.
 
Putin, for his part, made no comment about the incident until the next day. In stark contrast to his Defense Ministry, in a statement he issued after speaking with Netanyahu, Putin absolved Israel of responsibility. In his words, "It rather looks like a chain of tragic accidental circumstances. An Israeli jet did not shoot down our plane."
 
Following Putin's statement, Netanyahu sent a delegation led by IAF commander Maj. Gen. Amikam Norkin to Moscow to personally brief the Russian Defense Ministry about the findings of Israel's own investigation into the incident. Norkin provided the Russians with detailed proof that Israeli aircraft were not in the area when the missile strike occurred.
 
The Russian Defense Ministry rejected Norkin's data and stood by its own conclusion that Israel, not the Syrian S-200 crew, was responsible for the incident.
 
Three days later, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that within two weeks, Russia would provide Syria with the S-300 surface to air missile system. He also said that Russia planned to jam radars of military planes striking from off the Mediterranean coast. In his words, "In regions near Syria, over the Mediterranean Sea, there will be radio-electronic suppression of satellite navigation, on board radar systems and communication systems of military aviation objects on Syrian territory."
 
Eight days later, Shoigu announced that Russia had completed delivery of the S-300 system.
 
These new Russian assets can undermine Israeli air assaults in both Syria and Lebanon while bringing Israel into direct confrontation with Russian forces.
 
Moreover, with a tracking range that includes Europe, according to military analysts, the Russian electronic warfare and surface-to-air missile systems in Syria may threaten the U.S. operations in Syria and Iraq as well.
 
The immediate implications of the Russian move are dire. On the one hand, Shoigu said that Russia will be training Syrian crews to man the systems. But given Syrian incompetence (as revealed by the S-200 strike), and the long training period, it is clear that for at least the next three months, the S-300 system will be operated directly by Russian crews. The electronic warfare systems he described will likewise be Russian operated.
 
In other words, Russia is taking over direct responsibility for Syria's air defense. All operations within Russian-controlled air space will be met by Russian air defense teams.
 
Russia's immediate and vicious response to the September 17 incident indicates that it was preplanned. Russia's Defense Ministry seem to have seized on the incident to take actions it had long intended to carry out. Indeed, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced in April that Russia was considering transferring the S-300 system to Syria following the U.S.-British-French air strikes carried out in retaliation for a Syrian chemical warfare attack.
 
Russia's aggressive action has intimidated Israel into suspending its airstrikes in Syria. Although Israeli leaders have said repeatedly that Israel will not be deterred by the S-300 and will continue to attack Iranian targets to block Iran from entrenching its forces in Syria or transferring precision weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon, a senior Israeli official acknowledged to Breitbart News Sunday that Israel has not carried out any strikes in Syria since September 17.
 
The S-300 deployment's impact on the U.S.-Russian balance of power in Syria is less clear.
 
In late August, the Institute for the Study of War reported that at the time, Russian, Syrian and Iranian forces had deployed in the Deir Azzour region on the western side of the Euphrates River in preparation for an assault on U.S. and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) deployed on the eastern side of the river. U.S. forces at Tanf air base along the triborder area joining Jordan, Syria, and Iraq block Iran from transferring weapons and fighters to Syria overland from Iraq. U.S. forces in the Deir Azzour region block Russia from taking control of Syria's oil fields.
 
In February, U.S. forces and allied SDF forces in the Deir Azzour area east of the Euphrates came under direct attack by a combined force comprised of Russian mercenaries from the private Wagner group; Syrian and Iranian forces; and Iranian-controlled militias. U.S. special forces in the area, assisted by Kurdish and Arab forces and reinforced by Marines, defeated the assault. Hundreds of Russian contract fighters were killed by a range of U.S. air and ground forces.
 
In response to the renewed buildup of Russian, Iranian, and Syrian forces on the western bank of the Euphrates in late August, hundreds of Marines were deployed to Tanf, where together with U.S. special forces and SDF forces they carried out eight days of intense, live fire ground and air exercises.
 
The exercise had the desired effect. The Russian, Iranian and Syrian forces stood down.
 
But less than a week later, the Russians exploited the IL-20 downing to upgrade and take direct control over Syria's anti-aircraft systems in a manner that threatens both Israeli and American air operations.
 
What we know about recent events highlights what we don't know.
 
The following are two issues that require clarification before drawing any strategic conclusions about the current crisis.
 
1. What is going on with Putin?
 
On the surface, it appears that Putin is a minority faction in the Kremlin. His friendly disposition towards Israel and Jews is clearly not shared by the Russian Defense Ministry. Israeli officials say the vicious attacks on Israel emanating from the Russian Defense Ministry show that Soviet-styled anti-Semitism remains the dominant view in Russian military circles.
 
Was Putin overruled by the Defense Ministry? If so, what does that mean about his hold on power? What does that tell us about his capacity to make deals with Israel or the U.S. regarding Syria, Iran and other key issues?
 
If Putin wasn't overruled, does that mean his apparent moderation is a ruse? Has he been playing a good-cop, bad-cop routine with his Defense Ministry to lull the U.S. and Israel into complacency and set the conditions for Russia to threaten U.S. operations and interests in the Middle East?
 
It appears that at present Putin is becoming more hostile to Israel and the U.S. For instance, the Russians are reportedly seeking to use the new situation in Syria, where they are intimidating Israel into ceasing its offensive operations against Iran to force Israel to accept Russian mediation of the conflict between Israel and Iran. Given that Iran is Russia's ally, and that it seeks Israel's annihilation, it is impossible to imagine that Israel would be able to secure any of its strategic interest through such Russian-mediated contacts. Certainly the Russian initiative is designed to undermine U.S. leadership to curtail Iranian power.
 
So long as Putin's position is unknown, it is impossible to estimate the likelihood of reaching a peaceful accommodation with Moscow.
 
2. Can the U.S. or Israel - or the two in conjunction - take action to defeat Russia's takeover of Syrian airspace while averting a direct confrontation with Russia?
 
As Stephen Bryen explained at the Asia Times, the Syrian crews that may operate the S-300s are ill-equipped to handle the system. The system has no friend-or-foe identification (IFF) system. And it has a range that places Israel's Golan Heights in easy striking distance. A Syrian missile attack on Israel from the S-300 will likely cause a full scale war to break out. The Syrian crews' incompetence and the lack of friend-or-foe guidance makes the prospect of such a strike on Israeli territory, as well as further incidents of friendly fire against Russian aircraft, more likely.
 
The Russians have warned Israel not to try to take out the S-300 systems. An Israeli move to do so under the current hostile conditions could easily spark a war. A U.S. strike could also make Russia feel compelled to unleash its Iranian and Hezbollah partners to attack Israel and U.S. forces.
 
Israel and the U.S. have both claimed that they are capable of operating around the S-300. And in response to the S-300 deployment in Syria, according to some reports, the U.S. has moved F-35 stealth fighter jets to the region and agreed to provide Israel with additional F-35s from U.S. Air Force stocks.
 
If the U.S. and Israel wish to avert the conflict that a direct assault on the S-300s would likely precipitate, they could conceivably simply use the F-35s to discredit the system. If the F-35 is capable of evading the S-300, then such operations would not only defeat Russia on the ground, but they could also potentially cause significant harm to Russia's reputation as an arms seller.
 
Last week, India signed a deal to purchase Russia's S-400 surface-to-air missile system. How likely is that deal to come to fruition if the U.S. and Israel expose the failings of the S-300? What about Turkey's agreement to purchase the S-400?
 
While these key issues remain unknown, there are low-risk moves the U.S. can take in response to Russia's adoption of a new, far more aggressive posture towards Israel and the U.S. that could serve to deter Russian adventurism and empower any moderate voices in Moscow that may have been sidelined since Sept. 17.
 
First, the administration could recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. The move would empower Israel diplomatically and weaken the diplomatic position of Russia, Iran, and the Assad regime they control.
 
Second, the U.S. can launch a campaign to withdraw international recognition of the Assad regime.
 
Iran and Russia both base the legality of their operations in Syria on the fact that the Assad regime asked them to intervene in Syria. But the Assad regime only exists because of their support.
 
In truth, they are foreign aggressors asserting control over Syria and using a local Syrian proxy to legitimize their aggression. A U.S.-led campaign internationally to withdraw recognition of the Assad regime and remove regime representatives from international forums, including the UN, could weaken the Russian-Iranian political position in significant ways.
 
Third, the administration could ask Congress for a new, updated authorization for the use of force in Syria. Current authorization is based on the Obama administration's strategy in Syria. The Obama administration's strategy was to deploy U.S. forces to fight ISIS and take no action against Iranian or Russian forces in the country.
 
A revision of the authorization of force to reflect the changing strategic challenges on the ground, including the entrenchment of Iranian and Iranian proxy forces, and the offensive posture that Russian forces in Syria have adopted against the U.S. and its allies, could have a deterrent effect on Russia. It would also enable more flexibility over time for U.S. forces both to defend themselves and advance the wider U.S. objective of bringing about the withdrawal of Iranian and Iranian proxy forces from Syria.
 
Without clarity on Putin's position, the relative threat that the new Russian systems in Syria pose to Israeli and U.S. operations, and Israeli and U.S. options for evading and indirectly defeating the S-300 and the auxiliary electronic warfare systems Russia has now deployed in Syria against them, it is hard to assess the overall strategic balance of power in Syria.
 
There are low-risk moves the U.S. can take to diminish Russia's appetite for conflict. But more must be known to develop a comprehensive strategy for contending with Russia's newly aggressive stance in Syria.
 
How Iran Plans to Take Gaza - by Khaled Abu Toameh -
 
If anyone was hoping that removing Hamas from power in the Gaza Strip would improve the situation there and boost the chances of peace between Palestinians and Israel, they are in for a big disappointment. Hamas, which violently seized control over the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2007, is not the only terrorist group in the coastal enclave, home to some two million Palestinians.
 
In addition to Hamas, these are several other Palestinian terrorist groups in the Gaza Strip.
 
The second-largest group after Hamas is Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), which has thousands of supporters and militiamen. If and when Hamas is ever removed from power, PIJ has the strongest chance of stepping in to fill the vacuum.
 
You remove Hamas from power, you will most likely end up having to deal with PIJ - not a more moderate group. While Hamas could only be considered "good," in some alternate reality, its replacement would not be any better. Islamist fundamentalism is enshrined in the hearts and minds of tens of thousands of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.
 
The two Islamist groups -- Hamas and PIJ -- are like two peas in a pod. The two do not recognize Israel's right to exist and continue to call for an armed struggle to "liberate all Palestine," from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River.
 
Like Hamas, the Iranian-funded PIJ also has an armed wing, called Saraya Al-Quds (Jerusalem Brigades). Founded in 1981 by PIJ leaders Fathi Shaqaqi and Abed Al-Aziz Awda in the Gaza Strip, the Jerusalem Brigades is responsible for hundreds of terrorist attacks against Israel, including suicide bombings. In recent years, the group has also been launching rockets and mortars at Israel.
 
Although it considers itself an independent group, PIJ often operates in coordination with Hamas. The two groups even have a joint "operations command" to coordinate their attacks on Israel. Sometimes, they carry out joint attacks.
 
The Jerusalem Brigades likes to take to the streets in shows of force aimed at the other Palestinian terrorist groups in particular and the Palestinian public in the Gaza Strip in general. Generally, Hamas does not tolerate competition from other armed groups in the Gaza Strip, but when it comes to PIJ and its military wing, it is a different story altogether. When PIJ displays its power and weapons on the streets of Gaza, Hamas shuts up about it.
 
Hamas evidently knows that PIJ, a large and influential group, is dangerous to mess with. Hamas also seems aware that meddling with PIJ means getting into trouble with PIJ's paymasters in Iran. Like PIJ, Hamas is also dependent on Iran's political, financial and military backing. Iran considers PIJ its main ally and puppet in the Gaza Strip. Through PIJ, Iran inserts its tentacles into the internal affairs of the Palestinians, much to the dismay of President Mahmoud Abbas and his Western-backed Palestinian Authority.
 
Relations between Iran and Hamas have not been stable in recent years, largely due to Hamas's refusal to support the Iranian-backed regime of Syrian dictator Bashar Assad. Lately, however, reports have surfaced in some Arab media outlets that Iran and Hamas have agreed to lay aside their differences.
 
In the past few years, a number of Hamas delegations have visited Tehran as part of the group's effort to patch up its relationship with Iran. The last visit took place in October 2007, when a Hamas delegation comprising Ezzat Al-Risheq, Sami Abu Zuhri, Khaled Qaddoumi, Mohammed Nasr and Zaher Jabarin, visited Tehran to brief Iranian leaders on the latest developments surrounding efforts to end the crisis between Hamas and Abbas's Fatah faction.
 
Despite the apparent rapprochement, Iran has strong reservations about trusting Hamas. Its skepticism appears based on Iran's fear that Hamas is ready to reach a reconciliation agreement with Fatah and a truce accord with Israel. Such an alliance, in the eyes of Iran, would constitute a betrayal on the part of Hamas. Any agreement with Fatah would mean that Hamas is prepared to join forces with Abbas and, even worse, engage in future peace talks with Israel. Any truce agreement with Israel would mean that Hamas is prepared to lay down its weapons and abandon the armed struggle against the "Zionist enemy." This "surrender" would be anathema to the mullahs in Tehran, who have a declared goal of eliminating Israel.
 
As far as Iran is concerned, the PIJ is its real ally in the Palestinian arena. And as far as Iran is concerned, PIJ will always be seen as a natural replacement for Hamas in the Gaza Strip if Hamas ever does forge a deal with Fatah or Israel.
 
The PIJ, meanwhile, is doing its utmost to prove its trustworthiness to its masters in Tehran. Last week, PIJ's military wing again dispatched its heavily-armed fighters to the streets of the Gaza Strip in a show of force directed towards Hamas, Iran and the rest of the world.
 
Abu Hamzeh, a spokesman for the Jerusalem Brigades, proudly declared during the paramilitary march that his group "will never compromise or bargain on one inch of the land of Palestine -- all Palestine." He added: "Our weapons are the symbol of our pride and power of our people. We will resist all conspiracies and foil all schemes aimed at liquidating our cause."
 
So, what does all this mean for Gaza?
 
First, that the situation there is unlikely to witness any positive changes. Even if Hamas were to be removed from power, the Palestinians would continue to suffer under other radical groups such as the PIJ.
 
Second, that even if Hamas were to wake up tomorrow morning and have an about-face, striking a genuine truce with Israel, there will always be other terrorist groups that are prepared to breach the agreement any time they wish.
 
Third, that the Gaza Strip will continue to be swarmed by several heavily-armed groups that will continue to launch terror attacks on Israel and impose a reign of terror and intimidation on the Palestinian population.
 
Fourth, that neither Abbas nor any other third party would ever be able to set foot in the Gaza Strip, impose law and order and confiscate the weapons of the terrorist groups.
 
These are crucial factors that need to be taken into account by any international party that seeks a solution to the catastrophe called Gaza. Alternatively, one might to wish to continue to inhabit some alternate reality in which all be would be well if Israel would only ease restrictions on the Gaza Strip.
 
 
The Mask Drops: Russia Reveals Itself As Israel's Enemy - By Yigal Carmon -
 
A year ago, Russia's mask of non-hostility towards Israel was still in place, in the form of strategic coordination with Israel regarding the latter's bombings in Syria. This allowed it to conceal that it fully sided with Israel's enemies - Syria and Iran.
 
Even as it refrained from trying to stop Israel from bombing Iranian targets in Syria - as if it could have prevented this - it was at the same time enabling and sponsoring Iran's expansion into Syria.
 
An article I wrote a year ago presented the unvarnished facts about Russia's support for Iran's expansion in Syria at the expense of Israel's national security. It asserted that the Iranian forces' presence in Syria constituted an existential threat to Israel.
 
It further explained, for the benefit of those who could not conceive of Putin as so anti-Israel - after all, he had made Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu a guest of honor at the Moscow Victory Day parade in Red Square in May - that this was nothing personal against Israel, but, as they say in the Mafia, just business connected to Russia's rivalry with the U.S.
 
In truth, the strategic Israel-Russia coordination of Israeli bombings in Syria served Russian interests: Israel declared that it would continue the bombings no matter what, and an Israel-Russia military escalation could only draw the U.S. into the melee and expose Russia as a mere regional power that was no match for the U.S.
 
Following the September 18 downing of an Ilyushin-20 plane by Syrian missiles, Russia's mask dropped, and the true anti-Israel face of its policy was fully revealed. Indeed, Putin first attempted to conceal it by refraining from fully blaming Israel for the tragedy. But soon enough he joined his subordinates in blaming Israel, and announced that Russia would equip Syria with S-300 missile systems, which would, inter alia, protect Iranian forces in Syria from Israeli attacks.
 
Now the picture is crystal clear: The Russians, who originally enabled and sponsored the Iranian expansion in Syria as an anti-U.S. measure, will now also protect the Iranians in Syria from Israeli attacks. This constitutes an undeclared act of war against Israel by an enemy, i.e. Russia - since it will not be the Syrians operating the S-300s against Israeli aircraft, because they yet face a long learning curve to do this; it will, for an indeterminate time, be Russian officers.
 
But with Russia's equipping Syria with S-300s, and their inevitable operation by Russian officers against Israeli aircraft, the Russians risk a major military and technological debacle. They will learn, if they haven't yet from the Ilyushin tragedy, that Israeli-American technology is far superior to Russia's - and that goes not just for the S-300s now being shipped to the Syrians, but also for the S-300s and S-400s that Russia already has in place in Syria for its own defense. Perhaps only an internal Russian military investigation can show what these systems were doing when the Ilyushin was shot down.
 
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu rejects the Israeli version of events, according to which the Israeli planes were already back over Haifa when the Ilyushin was shot down. The Russians argue that the radar picture showed an Israeli plane using the Ilyushin as a shield. A possible explanation for this, revealed by the Israeli daily Haaretz, is that the radar picture available to the Russians was not actual, but was the product of Israel's electronic warfare.
 
Given that this will continue to be part of any future Israeli bombing, the advanced Russian missile defense systems will be rendered no longer marketable. Perhaps this is why the Russians, upon announcing that they will deliverer S-300s to Syria, simultaneously announced their willingness to negotiate with the U.S. on this delivery, in order to avert any possible clashes with Israel and their ramifications.
 
Russia's true face has been revealed not only in the military/strategic sphere - by providing S-300s to Syria - but also by its reversion to the old Russian/Soviet antisemitism that not even Russian President Putin's "special relationship" with Chabad can camouflage. Former Israeli Ambassador to Russia Zvi Magen noted: "The media blamed Israel on the day of crisis in a well-timed orchestrated manner, filled with antisemitic elements. This wasn't random." Given Russia's actualpolicy towards Israel, this should come as no surprise.
 
 
Israel's War with Iran is Inevitable - By Dr. Efraim Inbar -
 
Iran is a formidable enemy. A large country of more than 80 million people, endowed with energy riches, it has always been a regional power. Having an imperial past and revolutionary zeal (since the 1979 Iranian Revolution), Iran nourishes ambitions to rule over the Middle East and beyond. Furthermore, theologically there is no place in Iranian thinking for a Jewish state. Iran believes that Israel will either wither away following military pressure on its population or be annihilated when it is militarily weak and vulnerable.
 
As Iran challenges the status quo in the Middle East, a clash between Tehran and Jerusalem is inevitable. International history teaches us that when a rising power challenged the balance of power, in most cases war ensued. Sparta challenged an Athenian-led Greek city system, ending in the Peloponnesian wars. Prussia's quest for the unification of the German principalities under its helm ended in several European Wars. Similarly, Israel cannot tolerate a Middle East dominated by Iran and its radical ideology.
 
Unfortunately, much of the Arab world is in the throes of a deep socio-political crisis, particularly since the mistermed "Arab Spring," creating dissension and a political vacuum, which the sophisticated revolutionary elite in Iran has capitalized upon. These dynamics explain the rise of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the power grab of the Houthi Shi'ite sect in Yemen.
 
The revolutionary enterprise was also facilitated by the Middle East policies of the Bush, Obama and Trump administrations. American military intervention destroyed Iraq, a strong rival of Iran, further undermining the regional balance of power.
 
Subsequently, the display of weakness by Obama was replaced by a questionable Trump commitment to the security of the region.
 
The Sunni Arab states have been terrified by the advances in the Iranian nuclear program and by the successes of its proxies. They are weak. Saudi Arabia failed to contain Iranian influence in Syria and Iraq. Closer to home, it was not successful to change the pro-Iranian orientation of small Qatar.
 
Egypt, an important Sunni power, survived the domestic turmoil, but it focuses on literally supplying food to its population, fighting an Islamic insurgency at home, leaving little energy to parry the Iranian challenge.
 
Turkey, a strong Sunni state, albeit non-Arab, has preferred to act upon its Islamic impulses and its common interest with Iran on the Kurdish issue, forfeiting its potential to balance Iran. The result was an entente between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Gulf states with Israel. In the absence of a credible American security umbrella, the Sunnis understand that only Israel can oppose the hegemonic drive of Iran.
 
Iran reached a similar conclusion - Israel is the main barrier for achieving hegemony. Israel is a religious and strategic anathema.
 
Initially, Iran has waged war against Israel primarily by proxies. It envisions military actions causing exhaustion to the civilian population. In the 1980s, Iran trained and armed the Hezbollah, a Shi'ite militia in Lebanon, directing its military efforts to oust Israel from South Lebanon. Moreover, Iran has supplied more than 120,000 missiles of various ranges to Hezbollah, which cover most of Israel. The declared goal still is "to liberate Jerusalem from Zionist rule." In the meantime, Hezbollah has assumed control of Lebanon, turning the country into an Iranian satrapy.
 
Similarly, after Hamas took over Gaza in 2005, it became the recipient of large military aid from Iran, intended to enhance its capability to bleed Israel. As Sunni Hamas did not support the Iranian line in Syria, Tehran channeled its financial and military aid to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, which is subservient to Iranian wishes. By having a foothold in Gaza, Iran established an additional front against Israel in the south.
 
The current Iranian effort in Syria aims at establishing a third front in the northeast, along Israel's border on the Golan Heights. Moreover, it wants to acquire a land corridor to the Levant (Lebanon and Syria) via Iraq, where Iran has been successful to establish a military presence and influence, to facilitate the transfer of more advanced weapons to Hezbollah and gain access to the Mediterranean.
 
We can also detect Iranian efforts to destabilize the Jordanian kingdom, situated along Israel's eastern border. This is also part of Iran's attempt to encircle Israel with Iranian proxies. Shi'ite militias and/or the Islamic Revolutionary Guards in Iraq and Syria obviously threaten the Hashemite dynasty. The fall of Jordan would also endanger Saudi Arabia, Iran's arch-rival in the Gulf.
 
Neutralizing Israel's military power, by encircling it with proxies which have at their disposal thousands of missiles directed at Israel's strategic installations and centers of population, is an Iranian goal in its quest for hegemony in the Middle East.
 
In the absence of a clear American or Turkish determination to confront Iranian encroachment, only Israel has the power to stop it. Therefore, Israel has no choice but to wage war against Iranian entrenchment in Syria.
 
It is an illusion that Iran's nuclear ambitions can be curbed by international agreements. The bomb is the best insurance for regime survival and for achieving hegemony in the region. It is inconceivable that the mullahs will give it up. As the international community, including the US, has no appetite for a military confrontation with Iran, it is left to Israel to prevent its nuclearization. The only way to do it is by brute force, adding a new dimension to the war conducted already against Iran. This is an inevitable imperative for Jerusalem.

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